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Abstract 
There have been considerable discussions about why countries have interests in forming 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which typically take the forms of a “free trade area” (FTA) 
with Rules of Origin (ROO) and a “customs union” (CU) (World Bank, 2005). This dissertation 
contains three essays with three different models of trade under oligopoly to analyze various 
issues on preferential trade agreements.   
The first essay examines welfare implications of forming preferential trade arrangement 
(PTAs) between two asymmetric countries that differ in their market sizes.  Key findings are as 
follows. First, when market size asymmetry between two countries is not too large and ROO 
requirements are not too restrictive, the formation of an FTA with effective ROO can be welfare-
improving to both members.  Second, the formation of a PTA is more likely to emerge between 
countries of similar in their market sizes, ceteris paribus. Third, compared to the pre-PTA 
equilibrium, there are greater reductions in external tariffs under an FTA than under a CU such 
that a non-member country is relatively better off under the FTA.  
The second essay presents a three country model of trade under Bertrand price 
competition to analyze differences in welfare implications between an FTA with ROO and a 
customs union (CU). It is shown that the maximum limit of ROO requirements over which there 
are welfare gains from trade for FTA members depends crucially on the degree of substitutability 
of final goods (or the intensity of product market competition).  It is also found that member 
countries and their final-good exporters are better off in a CU than in an FTA.  There are greater 
reductions in external tariffs under an FTA than under a CU such that a non-member country is 
relatively better off under the FTA.   
The third essay presents a three country model of FTA with Cournot quantity competition 
and derives the maximum enforceable level of ROO over which there are welfare gains from 
trade to each member country.  It is shown that ROO and external tariffs are strategic 
complements such that the higher is the regional input restrictions, the higher is the external tariff 
necessary to induce firms to fully comply with ROO requirements. It is also shown that an FTA 
with effective ROO has a positive effect on the final-good trade.  But the trade-diverting effect 
does not occur in the final-good sector.   
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1.  Introduction 
Will big countries with a fairly large market have economic incentives to form 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with small countries?  Under what conditions will PTAs be 
welfare-improving for both big and small trading partners?  The last two decades have witnessed 
an unprecedented proliferation of trade agreements, which typically take the forms of a “free 
trade area” (FTA) and a “customs union” (CU) (World Bank, 2005).  An interesting observation 
is that countries forming an FTA or a CU are generally different in the sizes of their markets.  In 
an FTA, member countries, small or large in their market sizes, collectively eliminate barriers on 
certain goods traded among them.  But they individually set their own external tariffs toward 
non-members.  This constitutes a significant difference between an FTA and a CU, the latter of 
which requires member countries to set a common external tariff on imports entering into the 
union (Krueger, 1993; Krishna and Krueger, 1995; Panagariya, 2000).   
There are other distinctive aspects of an FTA.  To prevent re-exportation or trade 
deflection from a country with a lower tariff to another country with a higher tariff, FTA 
members sign in preferential rules of origin (ROO) under which products cannot get duty-free 
access to a partner’s market unless ROO requirements are met (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; 
Richardson 1995).1  Several different criteria may be adopted.  These include ROO requirements 
based on regional input or content restrictions, a change in tariff heading, particular processes 
that should be performed within an FTA; and a substantial transformation of a product.2  Despite 
their differences in criteria, there generally involves an “ROO-induced extra cost” in producing a 
final good eligible for preferential treatment under an FTA.  ROO not only generate production 
inefficiency,3 they may also cause final-good markets within an FTA to be segmented.  In a CU, 
                                                 
1 Grossman and Helpman (1995) examine, among other things, the effects of FTA with ROO that prevent re-
exportation from a lower tariff member to a higher tariff member. Richardson (1995) shows explicitly that there is 
no Nash equilibrium in setting external tariffs, because all members of an FTA compete to set the lowest tariff with 
respect to non-members. 
2 See, e.g., Krueger (1993), Thoening and Verdier (2004), Cadot, Estavadeoral, Suwa-Eisenmann, and Verdier 
(2006), and Krishina (2006).  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union, and the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement (AFTA), for example, all contain certain criteria of the ROO provisions which 
provide preferential treatment for member countries.   
3  See Krishna and Krueger (1995) and Krishna (2006).  Falvey and Reed (1998) analyze the cases of non-
preferential ROO and indicate that ROO may be used strategically as policy instruments.  This is due to the potential 
arbitrariness in categorizing the geographical sources of goods produced not in a single location.  Falvey and Reed 
(2002) further show that producers may modify their production processes and input mix in response to content 
requirements in ROO. 
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however, there are no ROO provisions and arbitrage activities are relatively costless so that the 
prices of products tend to be uniform across members' markets (Mukunoki, 2004).  In other 
words, there is internal market integration in a CU.  
The objective of this paper is to examine differences in economic effects and welfare 
implications between an FTA and a CU when member countries are asymmetric in their market 
sizes.  Based on a stylized three-country model of trade under oligopoly, we wish to answer the 
following questions that appear not to have been adequately analyzed or answered.  Under 
imperfect competition in final-good markets, will the formation of an FTA or a CU be more 
likely to emerge between countries dissimilar in their market sizes?  How will market size 
asymmetry affect their economic incentives of forming a PTA (either an FTA or a CU)?  Does an 
FTA or a CU allow member countries to have a greater degree of market size asymmetry?  What 
effects preferential ROO requirements have on the welfare of forming an FTA between 
asymmetric countries? Will the formation of a CU be preferred to that of an FTA with ROO, 
viewed from the perspectives of asymmetric member countries, a non-member country and the 
world as a whole?   
Firms inside an FTA are required to comply with ROO to be eligible for preferential 
treatments in trade between member countries.  ROO are effective only when extra costs 
resulting from obeying the rules are not too high; otherwise exporting firms within an FTA 
simply choose to pay tariffs (Ju and Krishna, 2002, 2005).  The formation of a CU permits 
member countries to trade with each other without paying tariffs.  One concern then is whether 
FTA or CU member countries will set high external tariffs to protect their own firms, which 
make non-member countries worse off.   Article XXIV of the GATT tries to secure non-member 
countries from welfare losses by forbidding external tariffs set by members of a trade bloc to 
exceed their pre-PTA levels.  In the present paper, we explicitly take this GATT requirement into 
account when determining optimal external tariffs for member countries.    
Our analysis complements the contribution by Mukunoki (2004) in terms of welfare 
comparisons between an FTA and a CU.  But the author does not take into account ROO 
requirements and their effects on increasing production costs of final goods for trade within an 
FTA.  Mukunoki (2004) adopts an oligopoly model of product differentiation and shows the case 
that a free trade area entails endogenous change from segmented to integrated markets for 
internally produced goods.  Our model differs from that of Mukunoki’s in several import aspects.  
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First, we consider the decisions of exporting firms within an FTA in complying with ROO 
provisions.  As such, in analyzing the case of an FTA, ROO-induced extra costs make internal 
market integration between member countries not a possibility.  Second, our analysis allows for 
the case that two potentially participating members are asymmetric in terms of their different 
market sizes.  Despite the differences in assumptions on economic conditions, our analysis 
complements the contribution by Mukunoki (2004) and has some interesting results common to 
both studies.  Without market integration, FTA formation makes non-members better off because 
of lower external tariffs set by FTA countries.  Under plausible conditions, welfare gain to each 
member country is higher in a CU than in an FTA. 
Our analysis is closely related to two recent contributions on FTAs.  One is Das and 
Ghosh (2006) who develop a model of asymmetric world economy in which there are at least 
four countries.  The authors show that FTA formation is more likely to emerge among similar 
countries.  In our analysis, we further take into account effects of preferential ROO provisions in 
an FTA.  We also examine differences in welfare implications between an FTA and a CU.  Our 
analysis also complements another contribution by Duttagupta and Panagariya (2007).  The 
authors show that ROO are not always harmful as they could make a previously infeasible FTA 
feasible, assuming that external tariffs remain at their pre-FTA levels.  In our analysis, we further 
allow external tariffs to be endogenously set by FTA members.  We find that when ROO 
requirements are not too restrictive, an FTA with ROO can be welfare-improving to member 
countries of asymmetric in their market sizes.  
In his contribution, Krishna (1998) examines the impact of FTAs on the internal 
incentives for multilateral liberalization.  The author challenges the contention that FTAs are 
superior to multilateral trade liberalization as a way of moving to free trade for all.  In his model 
of imperfect competition in segmented markets, Krishna (1998) looks at the issues on 
preferential trading arrangements from the political economy perspective and analyzes trade 
policy as the result of lobbying by interest groups.4  In our analysis, we pay attention to the 
production efficiency perspective of preferential trade agreements and compare differences in 
welfare implications between an FTA and a CU. 
                                                 
4 Grossman and Helpman (1995) further examine the political viability of FTAs when two countries negotiate a free-
trade agreement.  Based on a political-economy framework, in which industrial interest groups attempt to influence 
their government, the authors show that an FTA can be an equilibrium outcome.  For further contributions on FTA 
formation and interest group politics see, e.g., Krishina (1998), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), Mitra (2002) 
and Ornelas (2005).   
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple 
framework of trade under international oligopoly.   In Section 3, we first discuss the benchmark 
case with no preferential trade agreements of any form.  We then examine conditions under 
which two potential member countries find it beneficial to form an FTA, subject to the 
constraints that their exporting firms inside the FTA meet ROO.   In Section 4, we derive 
conditions under which two asymmetric countries form a CU by setting a common external tariff.  
In Section 5, we analyze differences in welfare implications between an FTA and a CU.  We also 
compare their effects on tariff reductions, consumers and firms in each member country, as well 
as world welfare.  Section 6 contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Analytical Framework 
 Consider a simple world that is composed of three countries, denoted as ,A  ,B  and .C 5  
Countries A  and B  are located in the same region but are asymmetric with respect their 
different market sizes.   In the absence of trading agreements, A  and B  engage in a two-way 
trade in final goods, with each country imposing a specific tariff on imports from the other 
(Brander and Spencer, 1984).  Countries A  and B  consider the formation of a PTA (either an 
FTA or a CU).  Country C  represents the rest of the world. 
In the three-country world, each country has a single firm called by its own country’s name 
and produces a homogeneous final good .q   Firms A  and B  do not export their final goods to 
country ,C   but firm C exports its final good to the markets in countries A  and .B   Denote ikq  
as country 'si  consumption of the final good produced by firm ,k where ,i A B and 
, , .k A B C  
We assume country i ’s aggregate utility function to be 2(1/ 2) ,i i i i iU Q Q Y    where i  
is a positive parameter, ( )i iA iB iCQ q q q    represents the final-good consumption in country ,i  
and iY  is the consumption of a competitively produced numeraire good which is freely traded.  
The utility function implies that country i ’s demand for final good is ,i i ip Q  where ip  is 
                                                 
5 Although model setting and assumptions may differ, the use of a three-country model to analyze issues on FTA 
with ROO can be found in several recent studies such as Anson, Cadot, Estevadeordal, de Melo, Suwa-Eisenmann, 
and Tumurchudur (2005), Ju and Krishna (2005), and Ishikawa, Mizoguchi, and Mukunoki (2007). 
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the final-good price in the country and i  represents its market size. 
The asymmetry of the two potential member countries is captured by their difference in 
market sizes.  Specifically, we assume that B A  , where ( 1)   measures the degree of 
market size asymmetry between the small country, A  and the big country, .B    
As in Ishikawa et al. (2007), we focus our analysis on how FTA formation affects the 
final-good markets by assuming that input markets are perfectly competitive.  We assume that, 
without ROO requirements of any form, the average and marginal costs of producing the final 
good for all firms are constant. For analytical simplicity, these costs are normalized to zero.  This 
allows us to pay special attention to other types of costs that firms may incur.   
Denote ikc  as the extra cost that firm k  incurs in producing or exporting one unit of its 
final good to country .i   When serving its own domestic market, 0iic   for an inside firm 
regardless of whether or not there is an FTA or a CU.   
Prior to forming a PTA, firm ( , , )j j A B j i   is required to pay tariffs for each unit of 
its final good exported to country i .  To firm ,j  its extra cost ijc  is equal to the tariff charged by 
country .i   After an FTA is established, a firm exporting its final good within the FTA incurs an 
extra cost if it chooses to comply with ROO.  In this case, ijc  represents ROO-induced extra cost 
and its value is positive (i.e., 0).ijc  6   Under a CU, member countries trade with each other 
without barriers.  In this case, the extra cost to firm ,j  its ijc  is zero. 
As for firm C  that serves the final-good markets in A and B, this outside firm is required 
to pay tariffs.  The extra cost iCc  to firm C  is equal to a specific tariff, the amount of which 
depends on whether there is an FTA, a CU, or without any form of a trade agreement.    
We consider a two-stage game.  In the first stage, governments of countries A and B 
decide whether or not to form an FTA or CU and thereafter determine their external tariffs.  In 
the second stage, firms choose their output levels and compete in the final-good markets in the 
region. We use backward induction to solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the 
three alternative trade regimes.  We begin with the second stage at which firms make their 
production decisions.    
                                                 
6 In Section 3, we will discuss in more details the increase in costs resulting from complying with preferential ROO 
requirements. 
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3. Optimal Output Decisions of Firms without Market Integration 
 Product markets in small and big countries are segmented prior to the formation of a PTA. 
This is because of import tariffs under a two-way trade.  For the case in which the two 
asymmetric countries establish an FTA, an inside firm is required to comply with ROO to be 
eligible for tariff-free in exporting final good within the FTA.  Product markets in the two 
countries remain to be segmented because of ROO-induced extra costs.  For the pre-PTA and 
FTA regimes without market integration, firm ( , , )k A B C  sells ikq  units of final good to 
country ( , ).i A B   Depending on extra cost ikc  in different situations discussed earlier, the total 
profit of firm k is: 
  
,
( ) .k i ik ik
i A B
p c q

                           (1) 
 We assume that each firm employs a Cournot strategy in its production decision, taking 
as given the quantities of the final good produced by all other firms.  Based on equation (1), we 
calculate the quantity of the final good exported to country ( , )i A B  by firm ( , , )k A B C  as 
follows: 
( )
.
4
i ij iC
ik ik
c c
q c
                   (2) 
Total consumption, ( ),i iA iB iCQ q q q   of the final good and its price in country i  are given, 
respectively, as:  
(3 )
;
4
i ij iC
i
c c
Q
    ( ) .
4
i ij iC
i
c c
p
                (3) 
The sufficient conditions for ikq  and iQ  to be positive are when the market size i  is large 
enough such that 4i ik ij iCc c c     and 1 ( ).3i ij iCc c     These conditions are assumed to hold.  
We then calculate consumer surplus and producer surplus for country i  as follows:  
  
2(3 )
;
32
i ij iC
i
c c
S
    
2 2( ) ( 3 )
;
16
i ij iC j ji jC
i
c c c c                 (4) 
where ,j A B  and j i .   
 Denoting ijt and iCt  as the tariff rates that country i  charges on imports from country j  
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and country ,C  we calculate total tariff revenue for country i  as follows: 
  
( 3 ) ( 3 )
.
4
ij i ij iC iC i ij iC
i ij ij iC iC
t c c t c c
R t q t q
                   (5) 
Each potential member country’s social welfare, which is taken as the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, and tariff revenue, is:    
i i i iW S R    
      
2 2 2(3 ) ( ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( 3 )
.
32 16 4
i ij iC i ij iC j ji jC ij i ij iC iC i ij iCc c c c c c t c c t c c                   
                    (6)
 3.1 Pre-PTA
 In the absence of trade agreements, country ( , )i A B  charges a uniform tariff to all 
imports of the final good from countries ( , , )j A B j i   and .C   Denoting it  as country 'si  pre-
PTA tariff on each unit of its imports, we have   
.iC ij iC ij ic c t t t                            (7) 
Substituting equation (7) into iW
 
in equation (6), setting the first-order condition that  
/ 0,i idW dt 
 
we derive the pre-PTA optimal tariff rate:7 
  3 .
10i i
t                         (8) 
The pre-PTA optimal tariff is positively related to market size in that the big country sets a higher 
tariff rate than the small one.  
Using equations (7) and (8), we calculate the equilibrium quantities, price, and total 
consumptions of the final good in country i  as follows: 
2 ;
5ii i
q    1 ;
10ij i
q 
 
1 ;
10iC i
q 
 
2 ;
5i i
p 
 
3 .
5i i
Q                 (9) 
Substituting the above equations back into equations (4)-(6), we have consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, tariff revenue, and social welfare for country i  as follows: 
     
2 24 1 ;
25 100i i j
   
 
29 ,
50i i
S 
 
23 ;
50i i
R 
 
2 22 1 .
5 100i i j
W           (10)
 
 In what follows, we use the pre-PTA equilibrium as the benchmark to evaluate the 
                                                 
7 It is easy to verify that the second-order condition for welfare maximization is satisfied. 
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alternative trade regimes. 
3.2 FTA with Effective ROO 
FTA countries do not charge tariffs on imports from their partners so that 
= 0, for , , ,  and .ijt i j A B i j   But they have independence in setting external tariffs on their 
imports.  Denoting the tariff rates as for , ,FTAit i A B  we have = .FTAiC it t  Differences in tariffs 
may cause a re-exportation of the final good from a lower-tariff member to a higher-tariff 
member.  To eliminate trade deflection, the FTA countries agree that products cannot get duty-
free access to other countries in the FTA unless their productions satisfy the ROO requirements.8   
Under preferential ROO, each inside firm’s cost of exporting its final good eligible for 
duty-free treatments increases.  With these constraints, we denote ( 0)   as the ROO-induced 
extra cost.  That is, .ijc   
Despite the formation of an FTA, final-good exporters within the FTA may or may not 
choose to comply with ROO (Ju and Krishna, 2005).  Whether an FTA firm decides to meet 
ROO depends crucially on (i) import tariffs set by FTA members, ,FTAit and (ii) the ROO-induced 
extra cost, .   For each unit of the final good exported to country i  by firm ,j  if  
,FTAit                (11) 
it is beneficial to the firm to comply with ROO.  Otherwise, the firm prefers to export the final 
good to country i  by simply paying tariff.  In this case, ROO becomes ineffective.  For the 
efficacy of ROO, member countries set their external tariff rates above .  Equation (11) thus 
defines the ROO-complying condition. 
 For firm C  outside of the FTA, it pays the specific tariff FTAit  when exporting its final 
good to country .i   In this case, .FTAiC ic t  Given that ,ijc   positive quantities of the final 
good as shown in equation (2) requires that  
 3 0
FTA
i it     and 3 0.FTAi it                       (12) 
We calculate the FTA level of social welfare for country i  by substituting = 0,ijt  
                                                 
8 There are different criteria for ROO in terms of (i) regional content requirements, (ii) a change in tariff heading, (iii) 
particular processes that should be performed within an FTA; and (iv) a substantial transformation of a product.  See, 
e.g., Thoening and Verdier (2004), Cadot, Estavadeoral, Suwa-Eisenmann, and Verdier. (2006), and Krishina (2006).  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), and the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
agreement (AFTA) all contain ROO provisions which provide preferential treatment for member countries. 
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 = ,FTAiC it t ijc   and FTAiC ic t  into equations (6) to obtain  
        2 2 2 2
31 [ 21( ) (14 6 )( ) 3 11 2 ] ( ) .
32 4
FTA
j jFTA FTA FTA
i i i i i i
t
W t t
                      (13) 
Unless the formation of an FTA is based on noneconomic or political objectives, it is plausible to 
assume that each potential member is willing to sign in ROO provisions that improve its social 
welfare.  Country i  decides to join an FTA with effective ROO only when the FTA welfare is 
higher than the pre-PTA welfare. That is, 
  .
FTA
i iW W                            (14) 
Equation (14) defines the welfare-improving condition of forming an FTA. 
The next step is to determine the degree of market size asymmetry and the range of the 
ROO-induced extra cost that guarantee welfare gains from trade for each member country.  Also, 
we wish to determine each member's optimal tariff.  The problem facing each member country is 
to choose FTAit  that maximizes 
FTA
iW  in equation (13), subject to the ROO-complying condition 
in equation (11), the welfare-improving condition in equation (14), and the constraints that 
quantities of the final good produced are positive as given in equation (12).  
For the big country, ,B  its solution to the constrained welfare optimization problem 
exists when the following conditions are satisfied (see A-1 in the Appendix):  
     1 1.2928   and  ˆ0 ,    where 224 27 5949ˆ ( ).77 385 296450A             (15) 
For the small country, ,A  its solution to the constrained welfare optimization problem also exists 
if the above conditions are satisfied.  When the degree of market size asymmetry is not too large 
(1 1.2928  ) and the ROO-induced extra cost is sufficiently small ( ˆ0    ), forming an 
FTA is welfare-improving to both the big and small countries.  Nevertheless, when the market 
size asymmetry is too large ( 1.2928  ), forming an FTA with effective ROO may be welfare-
deteriorating to at least one country (especially the big country, B ).  Investigation of equation 
(15) reveals that for 1 1.2928,   the critical value of ˆ  is negatively associated with .    
The findings of the analyses permit us to establish 
PROPOSITION 1.  Forming an FTA with ROO is welfare-improving to two participating 
countries when the asymmetry in their market sizes is not too large and ROO requirements are 
not too restrictive.   The critical value of the ROO-induced extra cost that makes FTA formation 
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welfare-improving is lower when the market size asymmetry is greater.  
 The economic implications of Proposition 1 are straightforward. Other things being equal, 
the likelihood of forming a successful FTA with ROO between two asymmetric countries is 
higher when their market sizes are similar.  Moreover, this likelihood is higher when ROO 
requirements are less restrictive. 
Assuming that the conditions in equation (15) hold, we use the welfare function in 
equation (13) to solve for the optimal tariff rate for each member country as 
1 1 .
7 3
FTA
i it                               (16) 
This indicates that the FTA optimal tariff is higher the larger the market size asymmetry, ,i or 
the higher the ROO-induced extra cost, .   
 A comparison between equation (8) and equation (16) indicates that  
FTA
it  < .it                       (17) 
This result is consistent with the requirement as specified by the Article XXIV of GATT that an 
external tariff should not be set above the pre-PTA level to avoid a negative impact on a non-
member country.    
Substituting the optimal tariff from equation (16) into equations (2-6), taking into account 
the cost conditions that 0,ijt   ijc   and = ,FTAiC iC it c t  we have equilibrium outputs, prices, 
consumptions, consumer surplus, producer surplus, tariff revenue, and social welfare as follows: 
 2 1 ;
7 3
FTA
ii iq   
 
2 2 ;
7 3
FTA
ij iq   
 
1 ;
7
FTA
iC iq          (18a)
  2 1 ;
7 3
FTA
i ip    5 1 ;7 3
FTA
i iQ              (18b)
 
 
2 22 1 2 2( ) ( ) ;
7 3 7 3
FTA
i i j       
 
21 5 1( ) ;
2 7 3
FTA
i iS         (18c) 
 
 
1 1 1( ) ;
7 7 3
FTA
i i iR     2 2 211 8 5 4 .18 21 14 49
FTA
i j i jW        
     
(18d) 
  
4. A Customs Union with Internal Market Integration  
In a CU where member countries trade with each other with zero tariffs, they collectively 
set a common external tariff with respect to non-member countries.  Also, firms producing within 
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the CU are not subject to ROO requirements.  Denoting the external tariff rate as CUt , we have 
from the cost conditions that  0ijc  ( , , , )i j A B i j  and ( 0).CUiCc t    Because of free trade, 
the final good q  may be resold between member countries A  and B  until their prices are 
identical, .CU CUip p  In the subsequent analysis, we allow for such an internal market 
integration between the CU members.9 
Inside and outside firms treat the two markets in countries A  and B  as an integrated one 
under a CU. As such, the total quantity of final good sold by firm ( , , )k A B C  to the single CU 
market is ,CUkq  where .
CU CU CU
k Ak Bkq q q 
 
Depending on extra cost ikc  in different situations 
discussed earlier, the profit functions of inside firm i  and outside firm C  are given, respectively, 
as  
 ,CU CU CUi ip q                     (19a) 
and  
  ( ) .CU CU CU CUC Cp t q                             (19b) 
 All firms independently determine their total output levels of the final good,  ,CUkq that 
maximize individual profits, subject to the uniform-price condition.  We calculate the solutions 
as follows: 
 
1 1(1 ) ;
4 2
CU CU
iq t  
 
1 3(1 ) .
2 2
CU CU
C Aq t   
                
(20) 
Equilibrium market price and total consumption of the final good in a CU country are:
  
  1 (1 ) ;
8 4
CU
CU
A
tp     1 (7 2 ).
8
CU CU
i i jQ t                (21) 
We calculate consumer surplus and firm profit in country i  as follows: 
   21 (7 2 ) ;
128
CU CU
i i jS t     21 [(1 ) 2 ] .32
CU CU
i A t             (22) 
Because of internal market integration in the CU, we cannot determine tariff revenue collected 
by each member separately.  Given a common external tariff ( CUt ) on imports from country ,C  
total tariff revenue collected by the CU is: 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Ishikawa, Mizoguchi, and Mukunoki (2007). 
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21 1(1 ) ( ) .
4 2
CU CU CU CU CU CU CU
AB A B CR R R t q t t                           (23) 
Based on equations (20)-(23), we calculate welfare for each CU country as   
 
2 2(7 2 ) ( 2 )
,
128 32
CU CU
i j i jCU CU CU CU CU
i i i i i
t t
W S R R
                    (24) 
where CUiR  depends on the distribution of the total tariff revenue, .
CU
ABR   It is plausible to assume 
that two potential member countries form a CU when each one’s welfare,  ,CUiSW  is higher than 
its pre-PTA welfare, .iW   That is, 
  .CUi iW W                       (25) 
We take into account this welfare-improving condition in determining the common external tariff.   
Article XXIV of the GATT requires that the post-CU tariff be no greater than the pre-PTA 
tariff in order not to negatively affect non-member countries.  In this case, we have .CU it t   
Given A B   and the pre-PTA optimal tariff, 310i it   (see equation (9)), we have .A Bt t    It 
follows that 
  .CU At t                           (26) 
In setting a common external tariff, the CU member countries jointly maximize the sum 
of their social welfare, ( ),CU CUA BW W  subject to the welfare-improving condition in equation (25) 
and the GATT tariff-reduction condition in equation (26).  Making use of equations (23) and (24), 
we calculate overall welfare ( )CUABW  for the CU as  
2 2 219 5 29 3( ) (1 ) (1 ) .
16 16 64 32
CU CU CU CU CU
AB A B A AW W W t t                        (27) 
The solution to the welfare-maximization problem exists and the equilibrium quantity of the final 
good consumption in the small country A is positive, 0,CUAQ  10 when market size asymmetry 
falls into the following range: 1 6.4. 
 
Considering this condition and the GTAA/WTO tariff 
requirement (see equation (26)), we have two interesting cases in solving for the common 
external tariff by the CU: 
Case 1: When 1 1.28, 
 
there is an interior solution.  We solve for the CU optimal tariff as: 
                                                 
10 When 6.4,   0.CUSQ    We rule out this case. 
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  5(1 ) .
38
CU
At
                           (28) 
Substituting CUt  from equation (28) into equations (20)-(24) yields the equilibrium outputs, price, 
consumer surplus, producer surplus, social welfare for each CU member and total tariff revenue 
in a CU:   
6 (1 ) ;
19
CU
i Aq     1 (1 ) ;19
CU
C Aq                 (29a) 
 
16 3 ;
19 19
CU
i i jQ     3(1 ) ;19
CU Ap               (29b)
 21 16 3( ) ;
2 19 19
CU
i i jS   
2 218(1 ) ;
361
CU A
i
            (29c)
 2 2 21 16 3 18( ) (1 ) .
2 19 19 361
CU CU
i i j A iW R       
            
(29d) 
 
2 25 (1 ) .
722
CU
AB AR                (29e) 
Case 2: When 1.28 1.8234   or 3.5099 6.4  , there is a corner solution.   But when 
1.8234 3.5099,   there remains to have a corner solution provided that the amount of tariff 
revenue collected by the big country is large enough.  That is when ˆ ,CU CUB BR R where 
2
23 3 3ˆ ( ) .
10 64 4 10
CU
B AR
        This condition ensures that forming a CU is welfare-improving to 
the big country, i.e., .CUB BW W   For these two possibilities of a corner solution, we find that the 
CU optimal tariff is: 
  3 .
10
CU
A At t                 (30) 
Substituting  CUt  from equation (30) into equations (20) yields the equilibrium outputs,  
  2( ) ;
5 4
CU
i Aq
    1( ) ;
4 5
CU
C Aq
                (31a) 
 We further calculate total consumption of the final good, equilibrium market price, 
consumer surplus, producer surplus, social welfare for each member country and total tariff of a 
CU as follows:  
 4( ) ;
5 8
CU
A AQ
    7 1( ) ;
8 5
CU
B AQ
    1( ) ;
5 8
CU
Ap
              (31b) 
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2
2(5 32) ;
3200
CU
A AS
   
2
2(35 8) ;
3200
CU
B AS
   2 21 1 2( ) ;
32 10 25
CU
i A            (31c) 
 
2
2(25 256) ;
640
CU CU
A A AW R
  
2
2(265 48 64) ;
640
CU CU
B A BW R
           (31d) 
 23 1( ) ;
10 4 5
CU
AB AR
                (31e) 
For the small country ,A its post-CU welfare is greater than its pre-PTA welfare.  This is 
because CUA AW W  even for 0.CUAR    But for the big country ,B  whether or not forming a CU 
is welfare improving cannot be determined unambiguously.  When the degree of market size 
asymmetry is “moderate” (1.8234 3.5099),   a welfare improvement to the big country 
requires a sufficient amount of tariff revenue from the non-member country C to cover the 
potential losses. This is because ˆ 0CUBR  when 1.8234 3.5099.   Thus, for 
1.8234 3.5099,   with an appropriate distribution of tariff revenue between the member 
countries, there will be welfare gains to each one under a CU.  We thus have 
PROPOSITION 2.  Forming a CU is always welfare-improving to small and big countries 
when their market size asymmetry is “sufficiently low”
 
(1 1.8234)   or “sufficiently 
high” (6.4 3.5099).  However, when the asymmetry in market size is 
moderate (1.8234 3.5099),   it is not in the interest of the big country to join a CU, unless its 
tariff revenue from the rest of the world is sufficiently large.  
 
5. Different Effects and Implications between an FTA and a CU 
As discussed in Section 3.2, relative to the pre-PTA equilibrium, there are welfare gains 
to both the small and big countries when their market size asymmetry is not too large 
(1 1.2928  ) and the ROO requirements are less restrictive ( ˆ0    ).  Further, Proposition 
2 shows that there are welfare gains to two asymmetric countries from forming an CU when their 
market size asymmetry is small enough ( 1 6.4  ) and when the big country receives 
sufficient amount of tariff revenue from a non-member country. In terms of differences in the 
degree of market size asymmetry between an FTA and a CU, we have  
PROPOSITION 3. Other things being equal, forming a welfare-improving CU allows for a 
greater degree of market size asymmetry than forming a welfare-improving FTA. 
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 When market size asymmetry is not too large (1 1.2928  ), either forming an FTA 
with less restrictive ROO requirements ( ˆ0    ) or forming a CU is welfare-improving to 
each member.  In what follows, when comparing differences between an FTA and a CU, we 
assume that both the asymmetry condition and the ROO restrictions hold unless otherwise 
specified.   
 
5.1 Effects on External Tariffs 
From it  in equations (8) and 
FTA
it  in equation (16), we find that the ratio of the post-FTA 
tariff to the pre-PTA tariff for the big country is smaller than that for the small country.  This 
implies that there is a greater tariff reduction by the big country than by the small country after 
the formation of an FTA. 
Moreover, we find that, for given ROO-induced extra cost,  , 
FTA
i
i
t
t
 decreases as the 
degree of market size asymmetry, ,  increases.  Thus, there is a greater reduction in the FTA 
optimal tariffs for both member countries when the degree of market size asymmetry is greater. 
 Equation (16) indicates that the FTA optimal tariffs for both member countries are 
increasing functions of .   We then have  
  垐0 0 1.
FTA FTAFTA
i ii
i i i
t tt
t t t
                           (32) 
Figure 1 illustrates for each country the upper and lower limits of the ratio of tariff after 
forming an FTA to its pre-FTA tariff.    
After forming a CU, although both member countries set a common tariff CUt (see 
equations (28) and (30)), the ratios of the related CU tariff to the pre-PTA tariff for the small and 
big countries are different due to their differences in the pre-PTA tariffs it (see equation (9)).  As 
can be seen from Figure 1, this ratio for the small country increases as   increases until 
1.28.    For the big country, the reduction in external tariff after forming a CU becomes 
relatively greater when   is larger. 
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                       Figure 1. Tariff Reductions under the formation of a PTA 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the optimal CU tariff is always higher than the upper limit of 
the optimal FTA tariffs for both the small and big countries.  We thus have  
PROPOSITION 4.  Despite the fact that there are ROO-induced extra costs when big and small 
countries form an FTA, tariff reductions by the two FTA members remain relatively greater than 
those when they form a CU.  Interestingly, the big country lowers its optimal tariff by an amount 
that is greater than that by the small country, regardless of whether they form an FTA or a CU.   
 
5.2 Comparing Profits of Inside Firms within a PTA 
In an FTA, there are fundamentally no trade barriers between small and big member 
countries other than their preferential ROO provisions.  But the ROO-induced trade cost, , is 
set at a level lower than the external tariff imposed by each member.  It is interesting to see how 
ROO requirements would affect firms inside the small and big countries where market sizes are 
different. 
As shown in equation (18c), the small country’s producer surplus, ,FTAA  is an decreasing 
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function of .   It follows that  
  ˆ ˆ 00 .
FTA FTA FTA
A A A                          (33a) 
But for the big country’s producer surplus, ,FTAA  it is a increasing function of .   It 
follows that  
  垐0 0 .
FTA FTA FTA
B B B                          (33b) 
Equations (33a) and (33b) indicate that, due to differences in market sizes, the small country firm 
prefers ROO requirements to be less restrictive whereas the big country firm prefers them to be 
more restrictive.  
 
  
   
  Figure 2.1  Producer surplus of country A
    
   Figure 2.2  Producer surplus of country B
 
 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate for each country the ratio of firm profit or producer surplus 
before and after the formation of an FTA.  The figures also illustrate the ratio of firm profit 
before and after the formation of a CU.  We find that the final-good producers in both the small 
and big countries are better off under a CU than under an FTA since 
  ˆ .
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producing inside the trade block are assumed to be identical in our analysis.  We find that the 
ratios of firm profits are decreasing functions of   for the big country, but are increasing 
functions for the small country.   After forming a trade agreement (either an FTA or a CU), 
member countries will share their markets with each other.  The small country firm is able to 
enter the large market in the big country.  When the market size differential is greater, the small 
country firm finds it more profitable from accessing to the large market.  Although the big 
country firm shares the market in the small country, the loss to the big country firm in its own 
large market may outweigh the gain to the firm in the small market.  This is especially true when 
the degree of market size asymmetry is significantly large.      
As presented in Figure 2.1, the formation of an FTA always makes the final-good 
producers in the big country worse off.  The effect on the final-good producers in the small 
country cannot be determined unambiguously, however.  It depends on the degree of market size 
asymmetry, ,  as well as the ROO-induced extra cost, .  As shown in Appendix A-2, we have 
the following two possibilities:  
(i) FTA AA   when (i) 1 1.0460   or (ii) 1.0460 1.1505   and 0 ;     
(ii) FTA AA    when (i) 1.1505 6.4   or (ii) 1.0460 1.1505   and .      
 It comes as not a surprise that the formation of a CU always makes the final good 
producers in the smaller country better off.  The effect on the final-good producers in the larger 
country cannot be determined unambiguously, however.  It depends on the degree of market size 
asymmetry, .   As shown in Appendix A-3, we have two possibilities:  
 (i) CU BB    when1 1.2056;    
 (ii) CU BB    when  1.2056 6.4.   
We summarize the above findings in the following proposition:  
PROPOSITION 5. In two asymmetric countries that form a PTA, inside firms unambiguously 
make more profits under a CU than under an FTA. The big country producer is hurt by an FTA 
but may be better off in a CU when the degree of market size asymmetry is sufficiently low.  The 
small country producer is better off under a CU but may be hurt by an FTA. 
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5.3 Effects on the Non-Member Country 
In the model of trade under oligopoly, the non-member country exports the final good to 
the region where two asymmetric countries may form an FTA or a CU.  Making uses of 
equations (1) and (19b), we calculate profits of the outside firm under different trade regimes as 
follows: 
  
2 21 (1 ) ;
100
C A   
        
    (34a)   
2 21 (1 ) 0
49
FTA
C A      when 1 1.2928   and ˆ0 ;         (34b)    
  
2 2
2
2
1 (1 )  when 1 1.28;
722
(5 4)  when 1.28 6.4.
800
A
CU
C
A
  
  
        
        
 (34c) 
It is straightforward to verify that FTA CUC C    and FTAC C   when 1 1.2928   and 
ˆ0 .    Also, we find that  CU CC    for 1  2.1322  , but CU CC    for 
 2.1322 6.4.    We thus have  
PROPOSITION 6.  For the three trade regimes we consider, non-member country finds it most 
beneficial under an FTA.  Nevertheless, the non-member country may be negatively affected by a 
CU when market size asymmetry between member countries is small. 
 Forming a PTA has two opposing effects on a non-member country.  One effect is 
positive in that FTA countries reduce their external tariffs.  The other effect is negative in that the 
non-member country is hurt due to the fact that the outside firm’s trade costs remain to be higher 
than those for the inside firms.  Proposition 6 indicates that, the positive effect may outweigh the 
negative effects under an FTA or a CU when the degree of market size asymmetry in member 
countries is large enough. 
 
5.4 Effect on Consumers in a Member Country
 
From FTAiQ  in equation (18b), we know that the FTA level of the final-good consumption 
in each member country decreases with .   Under this circumstance, we have  
垐 00 .
FTA FTA FTA
i i iQ Q Q                      (35) 
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate for the big and small countries the lower and upper limits of the 
final-good consumption after forming an FTA, as compared to their pre-FTA consumption levels.  
We find that this consumption ratio is strictly greater than one. This implies that, due to tariff 
reductions and lower trade costs between member countries, total consumption of the final good 
in each member country increases after forming an FTA.  We expect the FTA formation to result 
in a decrease in the equilibrium market price of the final good, causing consumer surplus in each 
member country to increase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Total consumption in country B Figure 3.2  Total consumption in country A 
 
 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 also illustrate for each country the ratio of the final-good 
consumption after forming a CU to its pre-PTA consumption.  For the big country, this ratio 
increases as the degree of market size asymmetry increases.  Note that this consumption ratio is 
strictly greater than 1, which means that the final-good consumption increases after the formation 
a CU.  However, for the small country, its consumption decreases as the degree of market size 
asymmetry increases.  We show in Appendix A-4 that the consumption ratio for the small 
country is greater than 1 when 1 1.6,   but is less than 1 when 1.6.    These results indicate 
that if the market size asymmetry is critically high ( 1.6),   consumers in the small country are 
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worse off under a CU.  
If the degree of market size asymmetry is not too large (1 1.2928),   the final-good 
consumption in the small country is unambiguously higher under an FTA than under a CU or 
without a PTA.  As a result, consumers in the small country prefer an FTA over a CU.   
For the big county, the relationship in the final-good consumption between the FTA case 
and the CU case cannot be determined unambiguously.  As shown in Appendix A-5, the levels of 
the final-good consumption depend crucially on   and . When (i) 1 1.0317   or (ii) 
1.0317 1.2353  and 9 51 ˆ( ) ,
19 133 A
     
 
consumers in the big country are better off 
under an FTA since .FTA CUB BQ Q  But when (i) 1.0317 1.2353   and 9 510 ( )19 133 A      or 
(ii) 1.2353 1.2929,  consumers in the big country are better off under a CU since 
.CU FTAB BQ Q    
We summarize the findings of the analyses in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 7. Forming an FTA with ROO makes consumers in each member country 
better off.  If the member countries are  dissimilar as their symmetry in market size is large, 
consumers in the larger country prefer a CU over an  FTA.   Although consumers in the  smaller 
country are better off  under an FTA than under a CU, they may be worse off  in a CU when the 
market size asymmetry is sufficiently large.  
 
5.5 Effects on Welfare of Each Member 
 We show in the previous section (see Proposition 2) that for each member county, there is 
a welfare improvement under a CU when 1 6.4.   We now discuss this welfare increase after 
the formation of a CU in more detail.   
 For the small country, From Proposition 5, its producer surplus is always greater than its 
pre-PTA producer surplus. From proposition 7, its consumer surplus decrease as market size 
asymmetry,  , increases and is greater than that without any PTA when 1 1.6. 
  
For 1.6,   
the increase in producer surplus after forming a CU outweighs the decrease in consumer surplus 
and the loss in tariff revenue.  This explains why for the small country, social welfare under a CU 
is unambiguously higher.  
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 But for the big country, we find that the result is ambiguously.  Under a CU, producer 
surplus decreases as market size asymmetry increases and is less than 1 when   is significantly 
large.  The big country’s consumer surplus increases as   increases. When market size 
asymmetry is not too large 
 
(1 1.8234)   or is large enough (3.5099 6.4),   the increase 
in customer surplus outweighs the loss in both producer surplus and tariff revenue.  When market 
size asymmetry is “moderate” (1.8234 3.5099),   the increase in customer surplus is more 
than offset by the decrease in producer surplus.  For the big country to be able to improve its 
social welfare from forming a CU, it would need to collect a sufficient amount of tariff revenues 
from a non-member country.  
 Recall that after forming a CU, the total tariff revenue to the CU countries is given in 
equations (29e) and (30e). Thus one member country’s tariff revenue is maximized when the 
other one’s is zero. We know that each member country’s welfare is an increasing function of its 
tariff revenue (see equations (29d) and (31d)). Thus,  
  
00 .
CUCU CU
ji i
CUCU CU
ii i RR R
i i i
WW W
W W W
                          (36) 
We also know that for 1 1.2928,   the FTA welfare is a decreasing function of the 
ROO-induced extra cost, ,  where ˆ0     (see equation (19e)).  In this case, we have  
  ˆ ˆ0 0 .
FTA FTA FTA
i i i
i i i
W W W
W W W
                            (37) 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the ratios of post-PTA welfare of each member country to its 
pre-PTA levels.  For the big country, the lower limit of the welfare ratio under an FTA is equal to 
one.  The big country prefers a CU over an FTA if 1.0807 1.2928.    For 1 1.0807,   CU 
formation is a preferred choice to the big country if its tariff revenue ( CUBR ) is “significantly 
large.”  For an acceptable value of  , we see from Figure 4.2 that there is a greater welfare gain 
to the small country under a CU than under an FTA, provided that its tariff revenue is also 
significantly large.  
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      Figure 4.1  Social welfare of Country B        Figure 4.2  Social welfare of Country A  
 
 
But we cannot tell whether both the small and big countries will prefer a CU over an FTA 
at the same time.  It depends crucially on tariff revenue to the two countries.  With internal 
market integration, we only know the overall tariff revenue collected by the CU (see equations 
(29e) and (30e)) but not the amount to each individual member.  It is interesting to identify the 
conditions under which both countries are better off under a CU than under an FTA.  This leads 
to the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 8. Whether there will be a greater welfare improvement for both asymmetric 
countries under a CU than under an FTA cannot be determined unambiguously.  But when each 
of the small and big countries collects a sufficient amount of tariff revenue, forming a CU is a 
preferred choice over an FTA.   
PROOF: See Appendix A-6. ∎ 
 Proposition 8 implies that the distribution of tariff revenue plays a role in affecting social 
welfare when there is internal market integration in a CU.  
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5.6 Effects on World Welfare 
 Finally, we examine differences between an FTA and a CU in terms of their effects on the 
overall welfare of the three-country world.  In our setting world welfare is defined as the sum of 
social welfare in the two member countries and producer surplus in the non-member country.  
That is,  
  ,m m m mG A B CW W W                     (38) 
where pre-PTA,FTA,CU.m   
We first calculate the pre-PTA level of world welfare by substituting iW  in equation (10), 
and (34a) into mGW  in equation (38) to obtain 
   2 221 1 .50CG A B AW W W                        (39) 
We then calculate the FTA level of world welfare by substituting equations (18d) and 
(34b) into mW  in equation (38) to obtain  
         
2
2 211 12 463 32 4631 .
9 77 1078 539 1078 A
FTA FTA FTA FTA
G A B C
A
W W W     
                
        (40) 
 
For the case that market size asymmetry is not too large (1 1.2928),   the FTA level of 
world welfare decreases as   increases for ˆ0 .     That is,   
  垐 00 .
FTA FTA FTA
G G GW W W                      (41) 
Figure 5 illustrates the lower and upper limits of world welfare under an FTA.  For ˆ0 ,    the 
FTA level of world welfare increases with the degree of market size asymmetry, .   Even though 
the FTA level of welfare for the big country decreases, when   is critically larger, the increase in 
the sum of the small country’s welfare and the non-member country’s producer surplus 
outweighs the decrease in the big country’s welfare. 
 Next, we calculate the CU level of world welfare by substituting equations (29d), (31d) 
and (34c) into mW  in equation (38) to obtain    
2
2
2
2
343 360 343 when 1 1.28,
722
775 80 736 when 1.28 6.4.
1600
A
CU CU CU CU
G A B C
A
W W W
   
   
            
       
 (42) 
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                    Figure 5. World welfare under the alternative trade regimes 
  
 As illustrated in Figure 5, world welfare increases with market size asymmetry when 
there is a CU.  Even though welfare for the big country decreases, when the value of   is larger, 
the increase in the sum of the small country’s welfare and the non-member country’s producer 
surplus outweighs the decrease in the big country’s welfare. 
There is an overall welfare improvement for the three-country world, regardless of 
whether the two asymmetric countries form an FTA or a CU.  As for welfare comparison 
between an FTA and a CU, we find conditions under which world welfare is higher under an FTA 
than under a CU.  That is FTA CUG GW W when (i) 1.2036 1.2928   or (ii) when 1 1.2036   
and   212 18500 1 0.19309 1 .
77 8867 A
            
  We thus have  
PROPOSITION 9. World welfare improves when small and big countries form a PTA (either 
FTA or CU), other things being equal.   World welfare is greater under an FTA than under a CU 
if either one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(i) The market size asymmetry is “moderate”(i.e.,1.2036 1.2928  ); 
(ii) The  ROO-induced extra cost is small. 
 It has been observed that there are more FTAs than CUs (World Bank, 2005).  From the 
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perspective of world welfare, our analysis may help explain conditions under which such an 
observation would occur. 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper, we have derived the conditions under which there are welfare gains from 
forming a preferential trade agreement for countries differing in their market sizes.  These 
conditions are shown to depend on the degree of market size symmetry between countries, the 
form of trade agreement as either a FTA or a CU, and ROO requirements in the case of an FTA.  
We have discussed differences in welfare implications between the two alternative trade 
agreements.  In analyzing the welfare effect of an FTA, we explicitly take into account the 
decisions of exporting firms in complying with ROO.  Key findings are presented as follows. (i) 
The formation of an FTA with effective ROO is welfare-improving when the asymmetry in 
market size between member countries is not too large and the ROO requirements are less 
restrictive.  (ii) Forming a CU is more likely to emerge between countries of similar in their 
market sizes.  (iii) However, forming a welfare-improving CU for participating countries allows 
for a greater degree of their market size asymmetry than forming a welfare-improving FTA.  (iv) 
Compared to the pre-PTA equilibrium, tariff reductions are relatively greater in an FTA than in a 
CU which makes a non-member country is relatively better off under the FTA.  (v) If the 
asymmetry in market size is moderate and the ROO are not too restrictive, global welfare is 
higher under an FTA than under a CU.   
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Appendix  
A-1. The constrained welfare maximization problem under an FTA 
The mathematical model of choosing FTAit  to maximizes 
FTA
iW  in equation (14), subject to the ROO-
complying condition in equation (12), the welfare-improving condition in equation (15), and the 
constraints that quantities of the final good produced are positive as given in equation (13) is: 
              
2 2 2 231max [ 21( ) (14 6 )( ) 3 11 2 ] ( )
32 4FTAi
FTA
j jFTA FTA FTA
i i i i i i
t
t
W t t
               ,       
subject to ,FTAit  3 0FTAi it    , 3 0,FTAi it    and .FTAi iW W   
For the big country, we solve this problem by the Kuhn-Tucker method and find that its optimal tariff 
exists only when the following conditions hold: 
1 1.2928   and ˆ0 ,    where  224 27 5949ˆ ( ).
77 385 296450A
        
The optimal tariff  is 
1 1 .
7 3
FTA
B Bt      
 For the small country, when 1< 1.2928   and ˆ0 ,    if there are not constraints, the 
solution of maximizing FTABW  is 
1 1 .
7 3
FTA
A At   
  
It is straightforward to prove that ROO-
complying condition, sufficient conditions and social welfare improving condition are all 
satisfied. Thus, when  1< 1.2928   and ˆ0 ,    the optimal tariff set by the small country 
exists and is equal to 1 1 .
7 3
FTA
A At     Unlike Country ,B  which has optimal tariff rate only 
when 1< 1.2928   and ˆ0 ,    Country A  may have solution of the problem when this 
condition does not hold. 
 
 
A-2.  Profits of firms under an FTA 
When 1< 1.2928   and ˆ0 ,    the FTA  level of producer surplus in the small country is: 
   2 2
2 1 2 2( ) ( ) .
7 3 7 3
FTA
A A A          
It is straightforward to prove that FTAA  is an increasing function of  ( ˆ0    ), when  1< 1.2928  . 
Thus for any given  (1< 1.2928),   we have:  
ˆ ˆ0 0
.FTA FTA FTAA A A             
The producer surplus of the small country A  before forming any PTA is: 
   2 2
4 1( ) .
25 100A A
      
It is easy to prove that when 1 1.0460,  ˆ .FTA AA      Since FTAA  is an increasing function of 
 for ˆ0    , we have ˆ0 ,FTA AA       when1 1.0460.   It is also straightforward to derive 
0
FTA
AA     when1.1505 1.2928.    Given ˆ 00 ,FTA FTAA A       we have 
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   ˆ0
FTA
AA      when 1.1505 1.2928.   
It follows that   FTA AA      is solvable when 1.0460 1.1505.    There are two solutions: 
    26 9 31 64 4642 1
35 10 2205 441 2205 A
            
   
and 
    26 9 31 64 4642 1 .
35 10 2205 441 2205 A
             
   
We find that   
ˆ0         when 1.0460 1.1505.    
Given that FTAA  is an increasing function of   for ˆ0    ,  when  1< 1.2928  ,  we can conclude 
that when  1.0460 1.1505  : 
(1) FTA AA    if 0 ;     and  (2) FTA AA    if ˆ.     
 
 
A-3. Firm profits in the big country under a CU  
When 1 1.64  , the CU level of profit for the firm in the big country is: 
 2 2
2 2
18 1  if 1 1.28;
361
1 1 2( )  if 1.28 6.4.
32 10 25
A
CU
B
A
  
   
         
  
Without forming any PTA, the level of profit for the firm in the big country is:  
   2 2
4 1( ) .
25 100
B A     
 The difference between CUB and B  is given as: 
   
 
 
2 2
2 2
1 3976 3600 1439  when 1 1.28;
36100
1 103 80 56  when 1.28 6.4.
800
A
CU
BB
A
   
   
             
  
It is straightforward to prove that ( )CU BB   decreases as   increases when  1 6.4.   By setting 
0,CU BB    we have the solution of 1.2056.   Given that ( )CU BB   is a decreasing function 
of  , there are two possibilities:    
  (i) CU BB    when1 1.2056;    
(ii) CU BB    when  1.2056 6.4.   
 
A-4.  
When 1 6.4,   the CU level of total consumption in the small country is: 
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16 3( )  if 1 1.28;
19 19
4 1( )  if 1.28 6.4.
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The Pre-PTA level of total consumption in the small country is:  
 
3 .
5 AA
Q    
When 1 6.4,   the ratio of total consumption under a CU over total consumption under a FTA for the 
small country is: 
   
80 5  if 1 1.28;
57 19
4 5  if 1.28 6.4.
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It follows that 
CU
A
A
Q
Q
 is a decreasing function of  ( (1 6.4)   as shown in Figure 3.2. By solving 
1,
CU
A
A
Q
Q
 we have 1.6.   Given that  
CU
A
A
Q
Q
 decreases with  , when 1 6.4,   we have 
CU
A
A
Q
Q
 being 
greater than 1 for 1 1.6.   But 
CU
A
A
Q
Q
is less than 1 for 1.6 6.4.   
 
A-5. 
When 1 6.4,   the CU level of total consumption in the big country is: 
  
16 3( )  if 1 1.28;
19 19
7 1( )  if 1.28 6.4.
8 5
A
CU
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Q
  
  
       
  
When 1< 1.2928   and ˆ0    , the Pre-PTA level of total consumption in the big country is: 
   
5 1 .
7 3
FTA
B AQ      
It is clear that for given  , where 1< 1.2928,   FTABQ  decreases with as   increases. Thus, we have    
ˆ ˆ 00
.FTA FTA FTAB B BQ Q Q          
It is easy to verify that when 1 1.0317,  ˆ .FTA CUB BQ Q    Since FTAB  is an decreasing function of 
, we have ˆ0 ,FTA CUB BQ Q     when 1 1.0317.   It is also straightforward to show that 
0
FTA CU
B BQ Q   when 1.2353 1.2929.    Given ˆ 00 ,FTA FTAA AQ       we have 
ˆ0
,FTA CUB BQ Q    when 1.2353 1.2929.   
 When 1.0317 1.2353,  the relation of FTABQ  and CUBQ is unambiguous. Solving 
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ˆ0
FTA CU
B BQ Q    gives
9 51( ) .
19 133 A
    Thus when 1.0317 1.2353  and 
9 51 ˆ( ) ,
19 133 A
      .FTA CUB BQ Q But when 1.0317 1.2353  and 9 510 ( )19 133 A     ,  
.CU FTAB BQ Q  
 
A-6.  Proof of Proposition 6 
With the formation of an FTA, the welfare of country i(=A,B) is: 
 2 2 2 2
31 [ 21( ) (14 6 )( ) 3 11 2 ] ( ) .
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FTA
j jFTA FTA FTA
i i i i i i
t
W t t
                
It is easy to verify that 0
FTA
i
FTA
i
W
t
  when 
ˆ0 .     This implies that for any ˆ(0 ),    we have 
      2 25 4max 0 .
14 49
FTA FTA
i i i jW W         
With the formation of a CU, instead, the levels of welfare for the two countries are:  
2
2
2
2
(45 24 292) when 1< 1.28;
722
(25 256)  when 1.28 6.4.
640
CU
A A
CU
A
CU
A A
R
W
R
   
  
         
 
 
   
2
2
2
2
(45 24 292)  when 1< 1.28;
722
(265 48 64)  when 1.28 6.4.
640
CU
A B
CU
B
CU
A B
R
W
R
   
   
          
 
 
WE compare CUiW  and  max FTAiW   for 1 1.2928   and find that each country has to collect a 
sufficient amount of tariff revenue to achieve an improvement in welfare from forming a CU.  That is, 
max ( )CU FTAi iW W   when ˆˆ ,CU CUi iR R  where 
 
2
2
2
2
683 1176 1673 if 1 1.28;
ˆ 35378ˆ
1335 1344   if 1.28 1.2928,
31360
A
CU
A
A
R
   
  
        
  
and  
21673 1176 683 if 1 1.0807;ˆˆ
35378
0 if 1.0807 1.2928.
CU A
BR
   

       
 
It is easy to verify that ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( )CU CUA BR R  is less than the total quantity of the final good imported to CU when 
1 1.2928.    
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) which typically take the forms of “free trade area/arrangement” and “customs 
union” (World Bank, 2005).  There have been considerable discussions about why countries form 
a free trade area (FTA) or a customs union (CU).  Using a political-economy framework, 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) are among the first to analyze conditions under which countries 
join an FTA. 11  In the present paper, we look at the efficiency aspects of forming a PTA (FTA or 
CU) and discuss differences in welfare implications between the two alternative trade 
agreements.  Specifically, we examine what effects forming an FTA or a CU have on consumers 
in member countries, on final-good producers inside and outside of a PTA, as well as on overall 
welfare of the member and non-member countries taken together. 
Countries that form an FTA eliminate barriers such as tariffs and quotas on goods traded 
among them, but they independently determine their external tariffs toward non-members.  This 
constitutes a significant difference between an FTA and a CU, the latter of which requires 
member countries to set a common external tariff on imports entering into the union (Krueger 
1993, Krueger and Krishna 1995, Panagariya, 2000).  Because FTA member countries do not 
have a harmonization of trade policies, a member country with a lower tariff on a product will 
benefit from the re-exportation of the product to other members (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; 
Richardson, 1995; Krishna, 2006). To eliminate trade deflection, member countries of an FTA 
agree that products cannot get duty-free access to partner countries within the FTA unless their 
productions satisfy Rules of Origin (ROO).12  Krishna (2006) presents a systematic review of the 
studies on FTAs with ROO and calls for further studies on the economics of ROO in FTAs where 
markets are characterized by imperfect competition. There have been considerable concerns 
                                                 
11 Grossman and Helpman (1995) examine the political viability of FTAs when two countries negotiate a free-trade 
agreement.  In their study, industrial interest groups attempt to influence their government, the authors show that a 
free-trade agreement with ROO can be an equilibrium outcome.  For further contributions on FTA formation and 
interest group politics see, e.g., Krishina (1998), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), Mitra (2002) and Ornelas 
(2005).  Duttagupta and Panagariya (2007) further show that preferential trading under ROO can enhance the 
political viability of FTAs.   
12 There are different criteria for ROO in terms of (i) regional content requirements, (ii) a change in tariff heading, 
(iii) particular processes that should be performed within an FTA; and (iv) a substantial transformation of a product.  
See, e.g., Thoening and Verdier (2004), Cadot, Estavadeoral, Suwa-Eisenmann, and Verdier. (2006), and Krishina 
(2006).  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), and the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area agreement (AFTA) all contain ROO provisions which provide preferential treatment for member 
countries. 
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about the use of preferential ROO in free trade areas (FTAs) as trade barriers to international 
trade (Krueger, 1993; Krishna and Krueger, 1995, Krishna, 2006). Although preferential ROO 
have the potential to be strategically used as a protective device in international trade, they 
constitute an indispensible component of FTAs.   Panagariya and Krishna (2002) point out that 
ROO are required to support the welfare-enhancing FTAs. 
In analyzing firm behavior in an FTA with ROO, Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005) show the 
possibility of regime switches when firms exporting final goods within the FTA may or may not 
comply with ROO.  There is compliance when external tariffs exceed extra costs induced by 
ROO.  An FTA with overly restrictive ROO is practically unrealistic, because exporters may 
simply pay tariffs for their products to be sold to member countries in the FTA.  One important 
issue that has not been adequately examined concerns the range of an ROO-induced extra cost 
that each member country of an FTA finds it welfare-improving to sign in ROO.   
Forming either an FTA with effective ROO or a CU allows an inside firm to incur a lower 
cost in exporting its final good to other member countries than an outside firm, which is required 
to pay tariffs for the exports of its final good.  So a concern about this is that the member 
countries will set a higher external tariff rate to make member countries worse off and protect 
inside firms after the formation of an FTA or a CU. Article XXIV of the GATT tries to secure 
non-member countries from welfare loss by forbidding external tariff to exceed the pre-PTA 
level (Mukunoki, 2004).  In our paper, we consider this constraint to prevent member countries 
of a PTA to set too high tariff to hurt non-member countries. Moreover, we find that, this 
requirement on tariff reduction is automatically satisfied with the formation of an FTA, and it 
makes the tariff after forming a CU equals to the tariff before forming a CU when the degree of 
competition is high. 
Taking into account ROO restrictions, we analyze how competition (or substitutability) 
between differentiated final goods affect the formation of an FTA or a CU.  We wish to identify 
the maximum extent of ROO-induced extra costs that potentially participating countries have 
economic incentives to accept,13 and the resulting effects on consumer surplus, producer surplus, 
                                                 
13 We look at the efficiency aspects of forming a preferential trade agreement by assuming that social welfare 
improvement (or maximization) is the goal of becoming a PTA member.  Grossman and Helpman (1995) examine 
the political viability of FTAs when two countries negotiate a free-trade agreement.  Based on a political-economy 
framework, in which industrial interest groups attempt to influence their government, the authors show that an FTA 
can be an equilibrium outcome.  For further contributions on FTA formation and interest group politics see, e.g., 
Krishina (1998), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), Mitra (2002) and Ornelas (2005).  Duttagupta and Panagariya 
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and social welfare of each member country after forming an FTA or a CU.  Further, we show 
differences in equilibrium outcomes between forming an FTA and forming a CU.  
Unless the formation of a PTA is based on noneconomic or political objectives, it is 
plausible to assume each potential member country is willing to sign in either an FTA or a CU 
that improves its social welfare. This “participation constraint” analysis constitutes the first stage 
of the two stage game at which potential member countries decided on forming a welfare-
improving FTA with effective ROO or a CU with choosing external tariff(s). At the second and 
last stage of the game, given the trade cost among member countries and the optimal tariff(s), all 
firms inside and outside the PTA independently and simultaneously determine output levels that 
maximize their respective profits. 
Our paper differs from those of Mukunoki (2004) and Ishikawa, Mizoguchi, and 
Mukunoki (2007) in several important aspects.  First, we explicitly take into account ROO-
induced extra costs in analyzing the welfare effects of FTA formation.  To eliminate the 
possibility of regime switches (Ju and Krishna, 2002, 2005), we consider the ROO compliance 
conditions when FTA members determine optimal external tariffs that maximize individual social 
welfare.  This is the present model’s distinguishing feature that has been ignored in the literature 
on FTAs with ROO.  Second, we derive the maximum extent of ROO-induced extra costs for an 
FTA.  Although external tariffs only target the final-good imports from countries outside of the 
FTA, the final-good producers within the FTA are subject to the external tariffs when their 
productions of the final goods for exports do not meet ROO requirements.  In this case, these 
producers are considered as “outside firms” under the preferential ROO provisions.  This point 
indicates the importance of determining external tariffs that effectively induce firms producing 
within an FTA to comply with ROO. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 presents a three-country 
model of trade under oligopoly with differentiated final goods.  In Section 3, we examine 
production decisions of firms in the three alternative trade regimes (pre-PTA, FTA, and CU).  
We derive optimal external tariffs for the different regimes and examine the conditions under 
which potential member countries find it welfare-improving to form an FTA or a CU.  In Section 
4, we analyze and compare the alternative trade regimes in terms of their effects on product 
prices, outputs, consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare.  Section 5 contains 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2007) further show that preferential trading under ROO can enhance the political viability of FTAs.   
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concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Analytical Framework 
2.1 Basic Assumptions 
We consider a simple framework in which there are three countries: ,A  ,B  and .C 14  
Countries A  and B  consider forming a preferential trading agreement (either an FTA or a CU).  
Country C  represents the rest of the world.  Each country has a single firm producing a single 
final good. Both the firm and the final good named by its country’s name.  All final goods are 
differentiated and the degrees of substitutability between any two of final goods A, B and C are 
same. Except that their final goods are differentiated, countries A  and B  in all other aspects are 
symmetrically identical.  These two countries engage in a two-way trade in their final goods, 
with each country imposing a specific tariff on imports from the other before forming a trade 
block (Brander and Spencer, 1984).  The two potential member countries do not export their final 
goods to country .C   But country C exports its final good to both countries A  and .B   
Following Mukunoki (2004), we assume that the aggregate utility function in the 
potential member country ( , )i A B  is 
 2 2
, , , , , ,
1( ) ( ) ( ) ,
2 2i ik ik ik ik A B C k A B C k A B C
U q q q Y 
  
                   (1) 
where   is a positive parameter, ikq  represents the consumption of final good ( , , )k A B C   in 
country i, and iY  is country 'si  consumption of a competitively produced numeraire good.  The 
parameter (0 1)    measures the degree of the substitutability between any two of final 
goods.15   
Based on the preference function in (1), market demand for final good k  in country i  is: 
 2
, ,
1 1( ) ,
1 2 1 2 1ik ik ikk A B C
q p p                   (2a) 
                                                 
14 Although the set-up and assumptions may differ, the use of a three-country model to analyze issues on FTA with 
ROO can be found in several recent studies such as Anson, Cadot, Estevadeordal, de Melo, Suwa-Eisenmann, and 
Tumurchudur (2005), Ju and Krishna (2005), and Ishikawa, Mizoguchi, and Mukunoki (2007). 
15 As in Mukunoki (2004), the value of  reflects the intensity of product market competition among the final goods.  
For   close to zero, the final goods are almost independent such that their competition is moderate.  For     close 
to 1, the final goods are almost homogeneous such that their competition is severe. 
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where   represents identical market size in countries A  and B , ikp  denotes the consumer price 
of final good k  in country i . 
By solving equation (2a), ikp  is given as  
 
, ,
( ) (1 ) .ik ik ik
k A B C
p q q  

                (2b) 
Based on equation (1), (2a) and (2b), we calculate consumer surplus in each potential 
member country in terms of equilibrium outputs of firm k  as follows: 
 2 2
, , , ,
1 ( ) ( ) .
2 2i ik ikk A B C k A B C
S q q 
 
                  (3) 
As in Ishikawa et al. (2007), we focus our analysis on how FTA formation affects the 
final-good markets by assuming that input markets in all three countries are perfectly 
competitive.  We assume that, without ROO requirements of any form, the average and marginal 
costs of producing the homogeneous final good for all firms are constant. For analytical 
simplicity, these costs are normalized to zero.  This allows us to pay special attention to other 
types of costs that the firms may or may not incur.  Denote ikc  as extra cost that firm k  incurs in 
producing or exporting one unit of the final good to country ( , ).i A B   This implies that when 
serving its own domestic market, 0iic   for an inside firm regardless of whether or not there is 
an FTA or a CU.   
Prior to the formation of a preferential trade agreement, firm ( , , )j j A B j i   is required 
to pay tariffs for each unit of its final good exported to country i .  To firm ,j its extra cost ijc  is 
equal to the tariff charged by country .i   After forming an FTA with effective ROO, a firm 
exporting its final good within the FTA incurs an extra cost.  In this case, ijc  represents an ROO-
induced extra cost and its value is positive (i.e., 0).ijc  16  Under a CU, member countries trade 
with each other without barriers of any form.  In this case, the extra cost ijc  is zero. 
As for firm C  that serves the final-good markets in countries A and B, this outside firm is 
required to pay tariffs.  The extra cost iCc  to firm C  is equal to a specific tariff, the amount of 
which depends on whether there is an FTA, a CU, or without any form of a trade agreement.    
Under each type of the trade regimes, firm ( , , )k A B C  sells ikq  units of its final good to 
                                                 
16 In Section 3, we will discuss in more detailed the increase in costs resulting from preferential ROO requirements. 
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country ( , ).i A B  Depending on different types of extra cost ikc discussed above and ikq  in 
equation (2a), the total profit of firm k  is given as  
 
,
2
, , ,
( )
1 1   ( ) ( ) .
1 2 1 2 1
k ik ik ik
i A B
ik ik ik ik
i A B k A B C
p c q
p c p p   

 
  
              

            (4) 
Denoting the specific tariff rates that country i  imposes on final goods imported from 
country j  and country C  as i   and ,it respectively, we calculate tariff revenue as follows: 
 .i i ij i iCR q t q                  (5) 
Social welfare ( )iW is taken as the sum of consumer surplus iS , producer surplus i , and 
tariff revenue iR .    
 .i i i iW S R                   (6) 
In the three-country model, world welfare has three components: social welfare of the 
two potential member countries, as well as producer surplus of the final good exporter in the 
non-member country.  It follows that world welfare is defined as   
 .G A B CW W W                         (7) 
Based on the above framework, we consider a two-stage game.  In the first stage, 
governments of countries A and B decide whether or not to form an FTA or CU and thereafter 
determine their external tariffs.  In the second stage, firms choose their optimal price levels and 
compete in the final good markets in the region. We use backward induction to solve for the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of the three alternative trade regimes.  We begin with the second 
stage to analyze production decisions of the firms under the alternative trade regimes.    
 
2.2 Optimal Pricing Decisions of the Firms  
Each firm maximizes own profit by choosing its price, taking the product prices of other 
firms and tariffs as given.  Solving for the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices17 of the final goods 
                                                 
17 This equilibrium results is solved under market segmentation.  Before forming an FTA or a CU, there is no 
integration between member countries’ final good markets, due to trade barrier. With the formation of an FTA, the 
restrictions of ROO reduce the market segmentation. After the formation of a CU, there is market integration 
between member countries’ market. However, the equilibrium results with market integration and without it are 
same, because two countries are symmetric in our model. 
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produced by the firms by maximizing each firm’s profit in equation (4), we have 
 1 (1 ) 1( ) .
2 2(2 3 ) 2 3ik ij iC ik
p c c c     
                 (8a) 
Substituting ikp in equation (8a) into equation (2a) yields the equilibrium outputs of firm 
k   as follows: 
 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 2 )( ) .
(1 )(1 2 ) 2 2(2 3 ) (2 3 )ik ij iC ik
q c c c       
            
             (8b) 
Substituting equations (8a) into equation (4) yields the maximized profit of inside and 
outside firms: 
 
2
,
1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 2( ) .
(1 )(1 2 ) 2 2(2 3 ) 2 3k ij iC iki A B
c c c       
                  
              (9) 
We assume that policy makers in member countries can observe the production behaviors 
of their firms.  We proceed to the first stage to examine how the potential member countries 
determine optimal tariffs that maximize their respective social welfare.  We then calculate 
reduced-form solutions for prices, outputs, consumer surplus, producer surplus, tariff revenue, 
and social welfare, followed by an analysis on welfare implications of forming a PTA. 
 
3. Three Alternative Trade Regimes 
3.1 Pre-PTA  
Prior to the formation of a PTA, country ( , )i A B  imposes specific tariffs on all final 
goods entering into its market.  Since good ( , , )j A B j i   and good C  imported to country i  
are taken to have the same degree of product similarity, tariffs on the two goods are identical.  
For the pre-FTA case, denote the same tariff rate that country i  imposes on good j  and good C  
as it  (Brander and Spencer, 1984).  That is,  
   ij i iC ic c t   .               (10) 
Substituting equations (8) and (10) into equations (3) (4) and (5), we have consumer 
surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue as functions of  it  for country i .  Substituting the 
resulting equations (in terms of tariff rates) into equation (6) yields country i ’s pre-FTA welfare:  
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2 3 4 2
2 2
2
1 6 14 12 2 3 5 ( ),
2(1 2 ) (2 3 ) (1 ) 2 3 4i i i j
W t t f t           
                 
       (11) 
where 
2 2 2
2 2
2
1 1 1 (1 )( ) .
1 2 4 2 3 (2 3 ) (1 )j j j
f t t t         
             
      
It is easy to verify that 
2
2
( ) 0,i
i
W
t
   which indicates that social welfare function is strictly 
concave on  .it   Using the FOC, 0,i
i
W
t
   we solve for the pre-FTA optimal tariff: 
 
2 3 4
2 3 4
4 8 5 10 3 ,
2(6 14 12 )i
t        
                     (12) 
and it is positive when 0 1.   The maximum level of social welfare for country i  without any 
type of PTA is: 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
2 3 4 2
118 664 1124 25 1656 828 706 381 100 .
4(1 2 )(6 14 12 )i
W             
                    (13) 
Substituting equation (10) into equations (8b), using it  in equation (12), we have 
equilibrium outputs of inside and outside firms without any PTA18.  Substituting the resulting 
equilibrium outputs into equations (3) and (5), we calculate the pre-FTA levels of consumer 
surplus and tariff revenue in member country i :  
2 2 3 4 5 6
2
2 3 4 2
(1 ) (34 164 205 107 299 13 112 ) ;
4(1 2 )(6 14 12 )i
S            
                    (14) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
2 3 4 2
16 84 116 77 262 60 154 53 24 .
2(1 2 )(6 14 12 )i
R             
                     (15) 
Based on it  in equation (12), substituting equation (10) into equations (9) yields the pre-
FTA levels of profits for the firms:  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
2 3 4 2
52 264 325 338 824 10 611 64 164 ;
4(1 2 )(6 14 12 )i
            
                        (16a) 
                                                 
18 These equilibrium results are positive when 0 1.   
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2 2 3 2
2
2 3 4 2
(1 )(4 9 8 ) .
2(1 2 )(6 14 12 )C
        
                   (17b) 
Substituting equation (13) and equation (17b) into equation (7), we have the pre-PTA 
level of world welfare: 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
2 3 4 2
134 736 1181 179 1872 730 913 365 164 .
2(1 2 )(6 14 12 )G
W             
                    (18) 
In what follows, we will use the pre-PTA welfare as the benchmark to determine the 
conditions under which the potential member countries A and B choose to form an FTA or a CU. 
 
3.2 FTA with Effective ROO 
In an FTA with effective ROO, member countries independently set external tariffs on 
their imports from outside of the region.  With no restrictions of ROO and in the absence of 
transport costs, a member country with a lower tariff on a product will benefit from the re-
exportation of the product to other members (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Richardson, 1995; 
Krishna, 2006).  To eliminate re-exportation or trade deflection, member countries of an FTA 
agree that products cannot get duty-free access to other countries within the FTA unless their 
productions satisfy the preferential ROO.19   
 Under an FTA, trade in final goods between the member countries is tariff-free. Denote 
the FTA tariff rate imposed on good C  by country ( , )i A B  as .FTAit  Based on the analytical 
framework in Section 2, we have  
   0FTAi   and .FTA FTAiC ic t            (19) 
Given the preferential ROO provisions, the cost of exporting one unit of final good from 
one member to another member increases. Denote the ROO-induced extra cost as  0 ,  we 
have  
   .FTAijc                   (20) 
In analyzing firm behavior in an FTA with ROO, Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005) show the 
                                                 
19 There are different criteria for ROO in terms of (i) regional content requirements, (ii) a change in tariff heading, 
(iii) particular processes that should be performed within an FTA; and (iv) a substantial transformation of a product.  
See, e.g., Thoening and Verdier (2004), Cadot, Estavadeoral, Suwa-Eisenmann, and Verdier. (2006), and Krishina 
(2006).  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union (EU), and the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area agreement (AFTA) all contain ROO provisions which provide preferential treatment for member 
countries. 
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possibility of regime switches because final-good exporters within the FTA may or may not 
comply with ROO.  When ROO requirements are restrictive, inside firms may switch to pay 
tariffs for their exports instead of complying with ROO.  In this case no firms comply with the 
ROO and FTA is fundamentally ineffective.  To induce inside firms to comply with ROO, we 
consider the condition that the specific tariff rate, ,FTAit  is set higher than the ROO-induced extra 
cost, 
   .FTAit                (21) 
Equation (21) can be referred to as the ROO-complying condition for an effective FTA. 
Based on equations (19) and (20), substituting equation (8) into equations (3), (4) and (5) 
yields the FTA levels of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue for each member.  
These functions are directly related to  FTAit   and .   We then substitute the resulting functions 
into (6) to determine each member’s social welfare, denoted as ( , ).FTA FTAi iW t   
Unless the formation of an FTA is based on noneconomic or political objectives, it is 
plausible to assume that FTA partners are willing to sign in ROO provisions that improve their 
social welfare.  Each potential member country chooses to join an FTA with ROO when its 
welfare, ( , ),FTA FTAi iW t   is higher than the pre-PTA welfare ,iW  
   ( , ) .FTA FTAi i iW t W               (22) 
Equation (22) can be referred to as the welfare-improving condition of forming an FTA with 
ROO ( 0).   
The next step is to determine the range of the ROO-induced extra cost that guarantees 
welfare gains from trade for all the participating members.  Also, we wish to determine the 
responses of the member countries in setting their external tariff rates.  The problem facing each 
member country is to choose FTAit  that maximizes ( , )FTA FTAi iW t  , subject to the ROO-complying 
condition (see equation (21)), and the welfare-improving condition (see equation (22)).  The 
optimal tariff rate set by each member country is 
 
2 2 3
2 2 3 4
2 3 (4 11 6 ) .
6 9 12 36 19 12
FTA
it
           
                            (23) 
It follows from equation (23) that FTAit  increases as   increases. Furthermore, FTAit  is 
strictly less than it .  The latter result is consistent with the requirement as specified by the 
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Article XXIV of GATT that an external tariff should not be set above the pre-FTA level.   
Note that the solution to the constrained welfare optimization problem exists only when 
ROO satisfy the restriction that ˆ,  20  where ˆ  is the critical value of the ROO-induced extra 
cost below which there is a welfare improvement for each FTA member.  When ROO are too 
restrictive in that ˆ,   the formation of an FTA is totally ineffective. 
 
 
      
  
 
 
 
    Figure 1.   The relationship between ˆ  and   
 
How does the intensity of product market competition affect the maximum extent of 
ROO requirements?  To answer the question, we use Figure 1 to illustrate the relationship 
between ˆ  and  .  Other things being equal, the critical value of the ROO-induced extra cost, 
ˆ , decreases as   increases.  The economic implication is interesting.  When the substitutability 
between any two of final goods increases (or when the intensity of the final-good market 
competition is higher) in an FTA country, ROO requirements should be set less restrictively.  For 
the case in which the ROO-induced extra cost is small enough, ˆ,   potential firms find it 
welfare-improving to join an FTA.   
Next, we wish to examine economic effects of changes in ROO-induced extra costs in an 
                                                 
20 See A-1 in the Appendix for  ˆ  . 
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FTA.  Using the optimal tariff rate FTAit  in equation (23), we calculate market equilibrium price 
of each final good, consumer surplus, profits of inside and outside firms, tariff revenue, each 
FTA country's welfare, as well as world welfare (see Appendix A-2 for detailed derivations).  
With the ROO restriction that ˆ0    , we have the following comparative-static results: 
0;
FTA
ikp

     0;
FTA
iS

   0;
FTA
i

  0;
FTA
C

    
0;
FTA
iR

   0;
FTA
iW

   and 0.
FTA
GW

                  (24) 
The implications of the results are presented as follows.  In an FTA, the equilibrium 
market prices of final goods are lower when ROO are less restrictive, other things being equal.  
Consumers in an FTA benefit from the lower prices for their consumption of the cheaper final 
goods.  But producers in FTA countries and in the non-member country are worse off.  With less 
restrictive ROO, the optimal external tariff becomes lower and the equilibrium amounts of the 
final good imported from the non-member country increase.  It comes as no surprise that for a 
decrease in the ROO-induced extra cost, the increase in the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus dominates the decrease in tariff revenue for each FTA country.  Consequently, social 
welfare is higher when ROO become less restrictive.  Under the same condition, world welfare 
unambiguously increases.  These findings further imply that with less restrictive ROO, both FTA 
members and the non-member are better off.   
The findings of the analysis permit us to establish the first proposition:  
ROPOSITION 1. In the three-country model of trade under differentiated oligopoly, only when 
the ROO requirements are not too restrictive will the formation of an FTA with effective ROO be 
welfare-improving to each member country.  The critical value of the ROO-induced extra cost, 
under which member countries are better off from FTA formation, decreases when the degree of 
substitutability of the final goods (or the intensity of product market competition) increases.  
Other things being equal, consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare in each FTA 
member are greater when ROO become less restrictive.  This condition also makes the non-
member country and the three-country world better off. 
 
3.3 The formation of a CU 
In a CU, member countries jointly set a common external tariff on their imports entering 
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into the block.  Denoting CUt as each CU member’s tariff rate on good ,C  we have 
.CU CU CUA Bt t t   Member countries trade with each other duty-free so that extra cost ijc  is zero.  
In other words, we have 
  0
CU CU
i ijc    .CU CU CUiC ic t t             (25) 
Based on equation (25), substituting equation (8) into equations (3), (4), and (5), we have 
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenue as functions of CUt  for each member.  
Substituting the resulting equations into equation (6) yields the optimal level of social welfare for 
each CU member: 
2 3 4 2 3 2
2 2
2 2 2
(1 )(12 36 17 16 ) 2 7 6 7 6( ) .
8(2 3 ) (1 2 ) 4(2 7 6 ) 8(1 2 )
CU CU CU
iW t t
               
                   (26) 
Similar to the case of forming an FTA, each potential member country has an incentive to 
join a CU if there is an improvement in social welfare: 
  .CUi iW W                 (27) 
We further take into account the GATT requirement that the common external tariff set by 
a CU be no greater than the pre-FTA tariff for the non-member: 
  .CU it t               (28) 
Maximizing CUiW  in equation (26) subject to the welfare-improving condition, equation 
(27) and the GATT/WTO requirement (see equation (28)), we solve for the CU’s optimal 
common external tariff:  
 
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
4 8 5 10 3 ,      if 0 0.59575;
2(6 14 12 )
4 12 14 3 ,      if 0.59575 1.
12 36 17 16
i
CU
i
t
t
t
        
        
                       
          (29) 
The result in (29) indicates that the substitutability of final goods plays an important role in 
affecting the level of the common external tariff.  We thus have  
PROPOSITION 2: In the case of forming a CU, member countries lower their common 
external tariffs on final-good imports relative to their pre-PTA tariffs, provided that the degree of 
the substitutability of final goods is “sufficiently high” (0.59575 1).    When the 
substitutability of final goods is critically low (0 0.59575),   each CU member keeps its 
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external tariff at its pre-PTA level under the GATT/WTO requirement for tariffs on non-member 
countries.  
Based on CUt  in equation (29), substituting equation (25) into equation  (7), (8), and (9) 
yields consumer surplus, tariff revenue for member country i  and non-member countries 
producer surplus for all inside and outside firms in a CU. Substituting resulting each CU member 
country’s consumer surplus, producer surplus and tariff revenue into equation (10), we can derive 
welfare for each CU member. Taking the sum of member countries’ welfare and non-member 
country’s producer surplus, we calculate social welfare for the three-country world (see 
Appendix A-3 for detailed derivations).  
Our next step is to compare differences between an FTA and a CU, using the case without 
preferential trading agreements as the reference base.   
 
4. Comparing the Alternative Trade Regimes 
In evaluating and comparing the different trade regimes, we play attention to their effects 
on external tariffs, the non-member country, producer surplus and consumer surplus in each 
member country, as well as world welfare.  
4.1 Effects on External Tariffs 
From equations (12), (23) and (29), it is straightforward to show that 
  0,t
   0,
FTA
it

   and 0,
CUt

              (30) 
which means the optimal tariffs for three regimes (without any PTA, an FTA with effective ROO 
and CU) decrease with the degree of the substitutability of the final goods,  . This result 
indicates that when final goods are more similar or when the market competition among the 
goods is more severe, the optimal external tariffs are lower, regardless of the type of the trade 
regimes. 
From equation (23), we see that each FTA member’s external tariff rate, FTAit , increases as 
the ROO-induced extra cost, ,  increases. For ˆ0 ,    over which there is a welfare 
improvement, we have ˆ ˆ0 0 .
FTA FTA FTA
i i it t t          Figure 2 presents the upper and lower 
limits of tariffs in the three alternative trade regimes.  For a given value of (0 1),    the FTA 
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optimal tariff rate is lower than the CU optimal tariff, since the upper limit of the former is less 
than the latter.  This implies that reductions in external tariffs are greater under an FTA with 
effective ROO than under a CU. 
    Figure 2.  The relationship between external it  and   
Based on the above analysis, we have 
PROPOSITION 3. The higher the degree of substitutability between any two differentiated final 
goods, the lower the optimal external tariffs under each trade regime (a pre-PTA, an FTA, or a 
CU one).  Moreover, reductions in optimal external tariffs are greater under an FTA than under a 
CU, despite that FTA members independently set tariffs high enough to induce their exporting 
firms to comply with ROO requirements. 
 
4.2 Effects on the Non-Member Country 
Next, we discuss what effects the formation of a PTA has on a non-member.  Rewriting 
equation (8) gives the equilibrium outputs of country C for three alternative regimes as: 
 
   
   
 
 
   
211 1 1
.
1 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 3iC iC iC ij
q c c c
       
             
              (31) 
This output function is decreasing in ,iCc  which is firm C’s unit cost of exporting its final 
good to country i , and is also decreasing in ( ),iC ijc c  which is unit cost difference in exporting 
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
0.59575 
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their final goods to country i  between firm C and firm .j  
According to the ROO-complying condition in equation (21) and the reduction in tariffs 
that FTAi it t , we have FTAiC iCc c  and ( ) ( ).FTA FTAiC ij iC ijc c c c      From equations (10), (12), (19), 
(20) and (23), it is straightforward to prove that FTAiC iCq q  for ˆ0    .  This is because the 
tariff deduction effect resulting from FTA formation dominates the effect of an increase in unit 
cost difference between firm C and firm .j  
From equations (10), (12), (25) and (29), a comparison in extra costs before and after 
forming a CU reveals that CUiC iCc c  and ( ) ( ).CU CUiC ij iC ijc c c c    It is also straightforward to 
verify that CUiC iCq q .  This is because the effect of an increase in the cost difference between 
exports from member country and nonmember country dominates the tariff deduction effect 
under the CU. 
From Proposition 3, we know that FTA CUit t  and FTA CUit t  which, according to 
equations (19), (20) and (25) imply that  FTA CUiC iCc c  and ( ) ( ).FTA FTA CU CUiC ij iC ijc c c c      Firm C’s 
unit cost of exporting its final good to country i  in an FTA is less than that in a CU.  Also, the 
difference in unit cost between firm C  and firm j  in exporting their final goods to country i  in 
an FTA is lower than that in a CU.  This explains why .FTA CUiC iCq q   
Based on the above analysis, we thus have .FTA CUiC iC iCq q q   Since the outside firm 
makes more profits as the volume of its final good exports increases, as shown in equation (9), 
we have .FTA CUiC iC iC      
PROPOSITION 4. Due to (i) greater reductions in external tariffs in an FTA than in a CU and 
(ii) the ROO-induced extra cost for exporting firms inside the FTA, a non-member country is 
relatively better off under the FTA.  CU member countries may lower their common external 
tariffs, but a non-member country is hurt by the trade block because the member countries have 
an advantage in trading their final goods duty-free. 
 
4.3 Effects on the Firm in Each Member Country 
Rewriting equation (8) gives the equilibrium sales of country i  to its domestic market 
and the market in country j  for three alternative trade regimes as follows:  
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(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ;
(1 )(1 2 ) 2 2(2 3 )iC iC ij
q c c     
         
  
2(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) .
(1 )(1 2 ) 2 (2 3 ) 2(2 3 )ij ij ij iC
q c c c        
             
        (32) 
Each country i ’s domestic sale, iiq , is an increasing function of ( ),iC ijc c  which is the 
sum of the extra cost to firm C  in exporting one unit of final good to country i  and the extra 
cost to firm j  in exporting one unit of final good to country .i  
Based on the optimal tariffs for the three alternative regimes (see equations (12), (23) and 
(29)), it is straightforward to prove that ( ) 2 ,FTA CUi it t t     which indicates  
 ( ) ( ) ( ).FTA FTA CU CUij iC ij iC ij iCc c c c c c       
It follows that  
 FTA CUii ii iiq q q  ,               (33) 
which indicates that either forming an FTA or a CU makes each inside firm worse off in its own 
domestic market since the domestic sale decreases. 
Meanwhile, firm i ’s export of its final good is a decreasing function of ijc and ( ).ij iCc c   
Using Proposition 3 and the ROO-complying condition, we can verify that 0 it   
and 0,CU FTAit t     which indicates 
 CU FTAij ij ijc c c   and ( ) ( ) ( ).CU CU FTA FTAij iC ij iC ij iCc c c c c c        
It follows that  
  ,FTA CUij ij ijq q q                (34) 
which indicates that either forming an FTA or a CU makes each inside firm better off since the 
quantity of the final food exports increases. 
From equations (33) and (34), we find that the CU levels of domestic sale and export are 
higher than those under an FTA, which implies that .CU FTAi i     We thus can infer that firms in 
member countries have greater incentives to support the formation of a CU than an FTA with 
ROOs. 
However, whether firms producing within a PTA will be better off in an FTA or in a CU 
cannot be determined unambiguously.  By comparing producer surplus for three alternative 
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regimes as shown in equation (16a), (27a), (a4) and (a.6), we find that for each member country 
producer surplus under a CU is greater than those under the cases of an FTA and a pre-PTA.  
Nevertheless, the relationship in producer surplus for the later two cases (PTA and pre-PTA) 
depends crucially on the degree of substitutability and the ROO-induced extra cost in an FTA.  
Specifically,  
FTA
i i    if (i) 0.70493   or (ii) 0.70493 0.76143   and 0 ;     
FTA
i i    if (i) 0.76143   or (ii) 0.70493 0.76143   and ˆ,      
where   makes ,FTAi i    and ˆ0 .    
PROPOSITION 5. In the three-country model of international oligopoly, firms producing 
within a trade block are better in a CU than either in an FTA with ROO or in the case without a 
PTA. When the degree of substitutability of final goods is small, forming an FTA with effective 
ROO may make member countries better off. 
 
4.4 Effects on Consumer Surplus of Each Member Country 
Next, we discuss how PTA formation affects consumers within a block.  We show in 
equation (a.2) in appendix A-2 that consumer surplus in each member country under an FTA, 
FTA
iS , decreases as the ROO-induced extra cost, ˆ, 0 ,    increases. It follows that  
   ˆ ˆ 00 .
FTA FTA FTA
i i iS S S          
Figure 3 illustrates the upper and lower limits of consumer surplus for each member 
country under an FTA, under a CU, ,CUiS  and without any PTA, iS .  
Based on the results in Figure 3, we have 
PROPOSITION 6. In the three-country model of trade under differentiated oligopoly, either 
forming an FTA or forming a CU makes consumers in member countries better off.  The ranking 
of consumer surplus between an FTA and a CU depends crucially on the ROO-induced extra 
cost in the FTA and the degree of substitutability of the final goods.  Specifically,  
FTA CU
i iS S  if (i) 0.65871 1   or (ii) 0 0.65871   and 0 ;S    
CU FTA
i iS S  if (ii) 0 0.65871   and ˆ;S     
where S makes .FTA CUi iS S  
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  Figure 3.  The relationship between external iS  and   
4.5 Effects on Social welfare of Each Member Country 
Under the assumption that the objectives of member countries to join a PTA are to 
improve their social welfare, we have that CUi iW W and FTAi iW W   when an FTA or a CU exists. 
As proved in Appendix A-3, we also find that CU FTAi iW W  for any given ,  where 0 1.    
This leads to 
PROPOSITION 7. In the three-country model of trade under oligopoly, forming a CU results in 
a greater improvement in social welfare than forming an FTA with effective ROO. 
Proposition 7 implies that member countries are better off in CUs than in FTAs, 
regardless of whether ROO requirements are restrictive or not.  This finding is consistent with 
Mukunoki (2004) that welfare gain from trade to each member is the highest in customs union.  
Relative to the pre-RTA equilibrium, an FTA with ROO is welfare-deteriorating for member 
countries when ROO content requirements are “significantly restrictive.” This result stands in 
contrast with Mukunoki (2004) that the formation of preferential trade agreements is always 
welfare-improving to member countries. 
 
4.6 Effects on World Welfare 
Finally, we examine differences between an FTA and a CU in affecting world welfare.  
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
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
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Based on our model, world welfare is measured by the sum of FTA countries’ social welfare and 
a non-member exporting country’s producer surplus. From Proposition 4 and Proposition 7, we 
know that FTA CUiC iC iC     and .CU FTAi i iW W W    It follows straightforwardly that world 
welfare increases under an FTA.  But whether world welfare is higher under a CU than under the 
case without any PTA cannot be determined unambiguously.  Nor can we draw unambiguous 
conclusions about the ranking of world welfare between an FTA and a CU.  
From equation (24), world welfare under an FTA is a decreasing function of the ROO-
induced extra cost ,  where ˆ0 .      Also, we have  
  ˆ ˆ 00
FTA FTA FTA
G G GW W W         . 
Figure 4 illustrates that world welfare under a CU is greater than that without a PTA.  
Given that CUiC iC   and CUi iW W , we can infer that welfare gains for member countries 
exceed the loss of producer surplus for the non-member country in a CU. 
      Figure 4.  The relationship between  GW  and   
Based on the above analysis and the results in Figure 4, we have 
PROPOSITION 8. In the three-country model of trade under oligopoly, world welfare is 
greater in a PTA (FTA with effective ROO or CU), relative to the pre-PTA regime.  But the 
comparison in world welfare between an FTA and a CU depends crucially on the ROO-induced 
extra cost in an FTA and the degree of the substitutability of final goods.  Specifically,  
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FTA CU
G GW W  if (i) 0.17426 1   or (ii) 0 0.17426   and 0 ;GW    
CU FTA
G GW W  if 0 0.17426   and ˆ;GW     
where GW  makes CU FTAG GW W  for 0 0.17426  . 
Although there is an improvement in global welfare from forming a PTA (either FTA or 
CU), we cannot draw an unambiguous conclusion concerning whether one trade regime 
dominates the other.  Preferential ROO requirements and the degree of competition in the final 
good markets are among the key factors in determining whether or not FTAs are preferred to 
CUs.  Specifically, for the case in which ROO requirements are not too restrictive or the intensity 
of market competition in final goods is high, global welfare is relatively higher under an FTA 
than under a CU. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The rapid proliferation of preferential trade agreements, especially in the last two decades, 
has prompted economists to look into their welfare implications.  This paper extends the existing 
literature on PTAs under imperfect competition by analyzing and comparing the economic 
incentives of forming an FTA or a CU.   Unlike much of the literature, we explicitly take into 
account preferential ROO requirements in an FTA.  This consideration is relevant given that 
final-good exporters within an FTA may choose not to comply with ROO when ROO-induced 
extra cost (say, due to an increase in the price of an FTA-made input) exceeds a specific tariff on 
the exports of final goods (Ju and Krishna, 2002, 2005). 
We find that whether all the participating countries are better off under an FTA depends 
on whether or not ROO requirements are overly restrictive.  Despite the possibility of positive 
welfare gains from trade for an FTA with effective ROO, member countries and their final-good 
producers are better off in a CU than in an FTA.  Nevertheless, consumers in member countries 
may be better off in an FTA than in a CU.  Because of greater reductions in external tariffs by 
member countries in an FTA than in a CU, a non-member country is better off under the FTA.  
For the case in which ROO requirements are not too restrictive or the intensity of product market 
competition is significantly high, both consumer surplus in the member countries and world 
welfare are relatively higher under an FTA than under a CU. 
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Appendix  
A-1:  The critical level of the ROO-induced extra cost 
We calculate ˆ  as follows: 
3
1 2
4
5
( )
ˆ
2
E
E E
E
E
 

  
where   
 
2 3 4
1 4 8 5 10 3 ,E          
2 3 4 5 6
2 108 648 1335 892 298 372 55 ,E              
2 3 4 5
3
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15
347328 5754240 41808960 172161504 426963132 592415928
    222511266 674120034 1126030229 372175775 674575709
    665952923 33930431 270875746 52988020 44739088
   
E     
    
    
     
    
    
16 17 18 19 20 4924869 4759687 849773 66265 2011 ,        
 
2 3 4
4 6 14 12 ,E          
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
5 144 1296 4536 7296 4047 2069 1551 2066 993 445 39 .E                    
 
A-2:  Reduced-form solutions for the case of an FTA  
Using the optimal tariff rate 
FTA
it  in equation (23), we calculate the post-FTA level of social welfare for each member as  
  2 2 ,FTA W W WiW                  (a.1) 
where  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2 2 3 4 5 2
144 1440 5832 11832 11343 1978 3620 515 3059 548 406 39 ,
(1 2 )(24 108 146 33 34 3 )
W           
      
                    
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 2 2 3 4
108 756 1983 2227 594 670 317 55 ,
(6 9 ) (4 20 31 11 6 )
W       
     
               
2 3 4
2 2
3(22 86 97 12 21 ) ,
2(1 2 )(6 9 )
W    
  
         
noting that these coefficients are all positive. 
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Substituting equations (19) and (20) into equation (8b), using FTAit  in equation (23), we 
have equilibrium outputs of inside and outside firms after forming an FTA with effective ROO.  
We then use the resulting equilibrium outputs and equations (3) and (5) to calculate consumer 
surplus and tariff revenue for each FTA member country: 
2 2 ,FTA S S SiS                  (a.2) 
2 2.FTA R R RiR         
where 
 
2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 2 3 4 5 2
(1 ) (144 1152 3460 4356 726 3184 2121 131 191 23 ) ,
2(1 2 )(24 108 146 33 34 3 )
S          
      
                   
2 2 3 4 5
2 3 2 3 4 5
(1 ) (36 224 509 484 130 37 ) ,
(6 21 17 2 )(24 108 146 33 34 3 )
S      
       
              
2 2
2 3 4 5
(1 ) (22 70 55 ) ,
72 360 570 240 70 4
S   
    
          
2 3 2 3
2 3 4 2 3 4 5
2 2 3
2 3 4 5 6 7
2 2
2 3 4 5
(1 ) (4 11 6 ) ,
(12 36 19 12 )(12 48 37 50 53 6 )
(1 ) (10 31 21 4 ) ,
72 468 1074 915 5 221 41 2
(1 )(2 3 ) .
36 180 285 120 35 2
R
R
R
    
        
    
      
 
    
             
           
       
 
 
Based on FTAit  in equation (23), we substitute equations (19) and (20) into equation (9) to 
derive profits of inside and outside firms: 
2 2 ,FTAi                                
2 2 ,C C CFTAC                     (a.3) 
where
 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 2 3 4 5 2
(1 )(144 1296 4512 7116 3509 2866 2116 1964 1069 422 34 ) ,
(1 2 )(24 108 146 33 34 3 )
          
      
                   
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2 3 4 5 6 7
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
72 480 1122 840 596 1144 342 80 ,
144 1152 3552 5052 2755 427 581 119 6
      
       
                
2 2
2 3 4 5
2(1 )(3 5 ) ,
36 180 285 120 35 2
 
    
            
2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2 2 3 4 5 2
(1 ) (144 1152 3460 4356 726 3184 2121 131 191 23 ) ,
2(1 2 )(24 108 146 33 34 3 )
C
         
      
                    
2 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(1 ) (36 224 509 484 130 37 ) ,
144 1152 3552 5052 2755 427 581 119 6
C
     
       
                 
2 2
2 3 4 5
(1 ) (22 70 55 ) .
72 360 570 240 70 4
C
  
    
            
           
Finally, substituting equations (a.1) and (a.3) into equation (7), we derive the post-FTA level of world welfare: 
2 2 ,G G GW W WFTAGW                              
where 2 ;G CW W     2 ;G CW W      and 2 .G CW W      
 
A-3:  Reduced-form solutions for the case of a CU  
 
Depending on the value of  , we have two possible cases: 
Case 1: 0 0.59575   
2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
2 3 4 2
(1 ) (352 1664 1928 1440 3117 228 1274 124 3 ) ;
32(1 2 )(6 14 12 )
CU
iS
             
               
2 3 4 2 3 4 5
2
2 3 4 2
(4 8 5 10 3 )(8 24 9 25 17 ) ;
8(1 2 )(6 14 12 )
CU
iR
             
                      
2 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
2
2 3 4 2
(12 18 27 25 23 )(12 42 33 19 21 ) ;
8(1 2 )(6 14 12 )
CU
i
              
                       (a.4)  
3 2 3 2
2
2 3 4 2
(1 ) (1 )(8 24 17 ) ;
8(1 2 )(6 14 12 )
CU
C
         
                     
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
2 3 4 2
1056 5888 9672 1104 15221 6442 7201 3124 1171 70 ;
32(1 2 )(6 14 12 )
CU
iW
              
              
                 (a.5) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
2 3 4 2
1184 6400 9832 2640 16531 4850 8843 2484 1789 142 3 .
16(1 2 )(6 14 12 )
CU
GW
              
              
                 
 
Case 2: 0.59575 1          
2 2 3 4 5 6
2
2 3 4 2
(1 ) (88 528 1062 618 367 296 95 ) ;
2(1 2 )(12 36 17 16 )
CU
iS
           
                   
2 3 4 2 3 4
2
2 3 4 2 3 4 5
(4 12 14 3 )(4 14 11 6 7 ) ;
(12 36 17 16 )(12 60 89 18 33 2 )
CU
iR
                
                      
2 3 4 2 3 4
2
2 3 4 2 3 4 5
2 (6 13 7 17 5 )(6 25 31 7 5 ) ;
(12 36 17 16 )(12 60 89 18 33 2 )
CU
i
                
                         (a.6)  
2 2 3 2
2
2 3 4 2
2 (1 )(4 10 7 ) ;
(1 2 )(12 36 17 16 )
CU
C
        
                   
2 3 4
2
2 3 4 5
22 86 87 14 37 ;
2(12 60 89 18 33 2 )
CU
iW
        
                    (a.7)  
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2
2 3 4 2
296 1984 4698 3842 1361 3004 116 634 61 .
(1 2 )(12 36 17 16 )
CU
GW
            
                
 
A-4: Welfare comparison between an FTA and a CU  
For the case of an FTA, we have from equation (a.1) that  
 0.
FTA
iW

                 (a.8) 
For ˆ0 ,     ˆ 00FTA FTAi iW W       where  
  
2 3 4
2
0 2 2
3(22 86 97 12 21 ) .
2(1 2 )(6 9 )
FTA
iW 
      
                 (a.9) 
For comparing the case of a CU to that of an FTA, we have from equations (a.5) and (a.9) that  
  0
CU FTA
i iW W   when 0 0.59575.            (a.10) 
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It follows from equations (a.8) and (a.10) that ˆ0
CU FTA
i iW W     for 0 0.59575.   
But when 0.59575 1,   we from equations (a.7) and (a.9) that 
   0
CU FTA
i iW W   .            (a.11) 
It follows from equations (a.8) and (a.11) that ˆ0
CU FTA
i iW W     for 0.59575 1.   
We therefore conclude that social welfare is higher under a CU than under an FTA since 
CU FTA
i iSW SW  when  0 1    and  ˆ0 .    
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1. Introduction   
Despite a dramatic proliferation of regional trade agreements in recent decades (World 
Bank, 2005), there have been considerable concerns about the use of Rules of Origin (ROO) in 
Free Trade Areas/Arrangements (FTAs) as trade barriers or hidden protections (Krueger, 1993; 
Krishna and Krueger, 1995, Krishna, 2006).  Specifically, the important and challenging 
questions posed to economists concern whether ROO provisions in FTAs are “welfare 
improving” and increase total trade (i.e., trade creation), and whether the extra trade arises at the 
expense of non-member countries (i.e., trade diversion).21  
Countries that establish an FTA eliminate tariffs and quotas on goods traded among them, 
but they do not have a harmonization of trade policies toward non-members. Without ROO in an 
FTA, however, a member with a lower tariff on a product will benefit from re-exporting the 
product to other members.  Grossman and Helpman (1995) examine, among other things, the 
effects of FTA with ROO that prevent re-exportation from a lower tariff member to a higher tariff 
member.  Richardson (1995) shows explicitly that there is no Nash equilibrium in setting 
external tariffs, because all members of an FTA compete to set the lowest tariff with respect to 
non-members.  One important implication of the studies is that for preventing trade deflection, 
FTA members sign in ROO under which products cannot get duty-free access to a partner’s 
market unless their productions contain a minimum extent of intermediate inputs originated from 
the region.22  Falvey and Reed (1998) indicate that ROO may be used strategically as policy 
instruments due to the potential arbitrariness in categorizing the geographical sources of goods 
produced not in a single location.  Falvey and Reed (2002) further show that producers may 
modify their production processes and input mix in response to content requirements in ROO.  In 
analyzing firm behavior in an FTA with ROO, Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005) show the possibility 
of regime switches because competing exporters within the FTA may or may not choose to 
comply with ROO.  There is compliance when external tariffs exceed the increased input costs 
under binding ROO.  But when ROO are overly restrictive, exporters of a member country may 
                                                 
21 The notions of trade creation and trade diversion are due to the seminal work of Viner (1950). 
22 There are several different criteria for ROO provisions in terms of (i) domestic or regional content requirements, 
(ii) a change in tariff heading, (iii) particular processes that should be performed within an FTA; and (iv) a 
substantial transformation of a product See, e.g., Krueger (1993), Thoening and Verdier (2004), Cadot, Estavadeoral, 
Suwa-Eisenmann, and Verdier (2006), and Krishina (2006).  The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
the European Union, and the ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement (AFTA), for example, all contain certain criteria 
of the ROO provisions which provide preferential treatment for member countries. 
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simply pay tariffs for their products to be sold to other countries in the FTA.  From the social 
welfare perspective of forming regional trade agreements, Panagariya and Krishna (2002) point 
out that ROO are required to support the welfare-enhancing FTAs.  In her interesting and 
systematic review, Krishna (2006) further calls for more studies on the economics of ROO in 
FTAs where markets are characterized by imperfect competition. 
There are several important questions that have not yet been systematically examined in 
the literature on FTAs with preferential ROO.  Given that ROO constitute an indispensible 
component of an FTA and have the potential to be improperly used as barriers to trade, what are 
countries have economic incentives to join an FTA with ROO?  Is there a maximum limit of 
regional content requirements over which there are welfare gains from trade for all participating 
members?  What are economic variables that determine the extent to which content requirements 
are capable of inducing voluntary compliance with ROO?  Stated alternatively, what are 
conditions under which there is a successful FTA formation with effective ROO input restrictions 
without having the possibilities of regime switches?  Answers to these questions have policy 
implications for how potential member countries determine their external tariffs in response to 
FTA formation and how the optimal tariffs effectively entice firms producing within an FTA to 
meet ROO.  More importantly, government policy makers may wish to know the economic 
determinants of an acceptable (or enforceable) range of the content ratio. 
Based on a stylized three-country model of trade under imperfect competition, this paper 
attempts to answer the afore-mentioned questions. Assuming that welfare improvement as the 
common goal of potential member countries in forming an FTA, we find that FTA formation 
depends on a set of economic variables. These variables include the value of the content ratio, 
the price difference between a regional input and a cheaper input imported from outside the FTA, 
the size of the market for the final good in each member country, as well as the structure of the 
oligopolistic final-good market (in terms of the number of firms producing inside and outside the 
FTA).  We find that each member country’s social welfare as a function of the ROO content ratio 
is strictly convex. Although there does not exist a unique optimal solution, the model allows us to 
identify the maximum extent of ROO input restrictions that potentially participating countries 
have an economic incentive to accept.23  This “participation constraint” analysis constitutes the 
                                                 
23 Unless the establishment of an FTA is politically motivated, which is beyond the scope the present paper, it is 
plausible to assume that social welfare improvement is the goal of becoming an FTA member.  Grossman and 
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first stage of the three-stage game at which potential member countries decides on establishing a 
welfare-improving FTA with effective ROO.  At the second stage of the game, given an 
acceptable content ratio, FTA members decide on external tariffs that maximize respective social 
welfare subject to the condition that their exporting firms comply with ROO.  At the third and 
last stage of the game, given the content ratio and the optimal tariffs, all firms inside and outside 
the FTA determine output levels that maximize their respective profits.  We analyze what effects 
FTA with effective ROO may have on the production decisions of the inside and outside firms.  
We further examine the resulting effects on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social 
welfare of each member country. 
The other key findings of the paper are as follows.  First, potential member countries find 
it optimal to reduce their external tariffs when forming an FTA with ROO. This implies that 
external tariffs and ROO are strategic substitutes in terms of FTA formation.  Interestingly, the 
post-FTA external tariffs increase with the content ratio in order to effectively induce the final-
good exporters within the FTA to comply with ROO.  The two policy instruments to a certain 
degree become strategic complements in terms of ROO compliance.  Second, potential member 
countries’ decisions on FTA formation and external tariff reductions cannot be isolated from 
their decisions on the implementation of effectively enforceable ROO content requirements.  
Third, in terms of the final-good trade among FTA members, ROO apparently place restrictions 
on the final-good exporters located inside the FTA because they are required to use regional 
intermediate input. But the resulting tariff reductions benefit the final-good exporters outside of 
the FTA. As indicated by Krishna (2006), relatively higher input costs associated with 
preferential ROO provisions “look like tariffs on imported intermediate inputs” within an FTA. 
In contrast to the standard argument in the literature, we find that ROO content restrictions may 
not have a negative trade-diverting effect on trade in the intermediate input (by exporting firms 
outside the FTA). Thus, the ambiguous trade-diverting effect on the intermediate-input trade and 
the positive trade-creating effect on the final-good trade should be taken into account 
simultaneously when evaluating whether regional trading arrangements exclude non-members 
                                                                                                                                                             
Helpman (1995) examine the political viability of FTAs when two countries negotiate a free-trade agreement.  Based 
on a political-economy framework, in which industrial interest groups attempt to influence their government, the 
authors show that a free-trade agreement with ROO can be an equilibrium outcome.  For further contributions on 
FTA formation and interest group politics see, e.g., Krishina (1998), Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), Mitra 
(2002) and Ornelas (2005).  Duttagupta and Panagariya (2007) further show that preferential trading under ROO can 
enhance the political viability of FTAs.   
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from the FTA markets on net.  We also find that FTA formation with effective ROO input 
restrictions makes exporters within the FTA worse off.  But consumers in each FTA country are 
better off.  Our simple model has policy implications for FTA members in determining a welfare-
enhancing content ratio and optimal external tariffs that eliminate the noncompliance problems 
with ROO.  The model may also help explain economic conditions that foster or hinder the 
proliferation of regional trade agreements under international oligopoly. 
The analysis of FTAs with ROO under oligopoly in this paper complements the 
contributions by Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005) in examining the complying and non-complying 
decisions of final-good exporters under regional content regulations.  The authors assume that 
the final-good market is perfectly competitive.  Our paper also complements a recent 
contribution by Ishikawa, Mizoguchi, and Mukunoki (2007).  The authors develop a model that 
examines the welfare effects of FTA with ROO when the final-good producers engage in 
Bertrand price competition.  In our model of Cournot quantity competition in which ROO 
content restrictions are explicitly spelled out, we further investigate the following: (i) The 
maximum extent of ROO that generates a welfare improvement for FTA formation; (ii) FTA 
members’ optimal decisions on external tariffs that effectively induce their firms to comply with 
ROO; and (iii) The potentially important economic factors that affect the incentives for 
establishing a welfare-enhancing FTA with enforceable ROO, especially the role played by the 
structure of the oligopolistic final-good market. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present an 
analytical framework of international oligopoly to examine the trade regimes before and after the 
establishment of an FTA, using the pre-FTA equilibrium as the reference base.  We analyze the 
production decisions of the firms inside and outside the FTA for the two alternative regimes.  In 
Section 3, we determine optimal external tariffs for FTA members subject to the constraints that 
their firms meet ROO.  In Section 4, we discuss how the economic incentive of forming an FTA 
is affected by the structure of the final-good market.  We then analyze the range of the content 
ratio that improves welfare for each FTA member.  In Section 5, given the range of the welfare-
improving content ratio, we discuss what effects FTA formation and changes in the content ratio 
have on trade in the final good, on trade in the intermediate input, as well as on consumer and 
producer surplus in each FTA member.  Section 6 contains concluding remarks. 
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2. The Model Set-Up 
 
2.1 Basic Assumptions and Regional Content Requirements in ROO 
To analyze the welfare implications of FTA formation with effective ROO, we employ a 
simple setting in which there are three countries: ,A  ,B  and .C 24  Countries A  and ,B  which 
are taken to be symmetric in a region, consider the formation of an FTA.  Country C  represents 
a country outside of the region.  In either country A  or ,B  there are m  firms producing a 
homogeneous final good q  by the use of an intermediate input .x   To focus primarily on the 
final-good markets within an FTA, we assume that input markets in countries A  and B  are 
characterized by perfect competition. 
The price of the regional input in countries A  and B  is assumed to be higher than that of 
an intermediate input in country ,C  with the price difference being equal to ( 0).h  25  Denoting 
country C’s input price as ,oh  the regional input price is then given as .oh h   We assume that 
input market in country C  (i.e., the rest of the world) is perfectly competitive.  Also, in country 
C  there are n  firms producing the homogeneous final good q  for export to countries A  and .B  
Prior to the formation of an FTA, countries A  and B  engage in a two-way trade in the 
final good, with each country imposing a specific tariff on the good imported from the other 
country (Brander and Spencer, 1984).  Firms located in both countries A  and B  purchase their 
intermediate inputs from country C  since 0.h    After an FTA is formed, trade in the final good 
q  between countries A  and B  is tariff-free if their exporting firms use a certain proportion of 
their intermediate inputs originated from the region as specified in ROO provisions.  For an 
inside firm in country i ( , )A B  that meets ROO, its input component of the final good q  to be 
exported to county j ( , , )A B i  must satisfy the following condition: 
,
, ,
,i r C
i r i r
x
x x
                 (1) 
                                                 
24 Although the set-up and assumptions may differ, the use of a three-country model to analyze issues on FTA with 
ROO can be found in several recent studies such as Anson, Cadot, Estevadeordal, de Melo, Suwa-Eisenmann, and 
Tumurchudur (2005), Ju and Krishna (2005), and Ishikawa, Mizoguchi, and Mukunoki (2007).  FTAs may be an 
arrangement of two or more countries.  But the prevailing FTAs are signed between two countries (World Bank, 
2005). 
25 The assumption of symmetry between countries A and B implies that the prices of the regional inputs in the two 
countries are identical. 
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where   represents the content ratio (0 1),   and ,i rx  and ,Ci rx  are the amounts of the 
intermediate inputs that country i’s thr  firm purchases from the region and country ,C  
respectively. 
We adopt the simple production technology for all firms that one unit of input is required 
to produce one unit of the final good.  That is, .q x   Since the regional input price is strictly 
higher than the imported input price, all the inside firms use the least proportion of their inputs 
from the region that satisfies the content restrictions as specified in equation (1).  In this case, if  
the thr  inside firm in country i  complies with ROO, its input cost in exporting one unit of the 
final good to country j  becomes , ( ) .i r oc h h     For analytical simplicity, the price of the 
imported input is normalized to zero, i.e., 0.oh    It follows that 
, ( ) ,i rc h                             (2) 
which reflects ROO-induced input cost increase for all the inside firms. 
Denote ,
i
i rq  and ,
i
j rq  as the quantities of final good that the 
thr ( 1,..., )m  firm in country 
i ( , )A B sells to its domestic market and to country j ( , , ),A B i  respectively.  Also, let ,Ci kq  
represent the quantity of final good that the thk ( 1,..., )n  firm in country C  exports to country 
.i Denoting iQ  as the overall consumption of the final good in country ,i we have 
, , ,
1 1 1
,
m m n
i j C
i i r i s i k
r s k
Q q q q
  
      where ,
1
m
i
i r
r
q

  is the amount purchased from the domestic firms, 
,
1
m
j
i s
s
q

  is the amount imported from a member country, and ,
1
n
C
i k
k
q

  is the amount imported from 
outside the FTA.  The (inverse) market demand for the final good in country i  is taken to be 
linear: 
,i ip Q                    (3) 
where 0  and 0.    The parameter   can be used to reflect the size of the final-good 
market in a potential member country.  We also assume that all the inside and outside firms adopt 
a Cournot strategy in their production decisions. 
Despite the formation of an FTA between countries A  and ,B  final-good exporters 
within the FTA may or may not choose to comply with ROO (Ju and Krishna, 2005).  Whether 
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an inside firm in country j decides to meet ROO depends crucially on (i) import tariff set by the 
member country i, it , and (ii) the ROO-induced input cost increase, h , in the exportation of the 
final good.26  For each unit of the final good to be exported by a firm in country j  to the market 
in country i  within the FTA, if the specific tariff exceeds the input cost increase such that 
,it h                 (4) 
it is to the benefit of the firm to comply with ROO.  Thus, for the efficacy of the ROO provisions, 
member countries should set their external tariff rates above the ROO-induced input cost 
increase ( ).h   Equations (4) thus define the ROO-complying condition under which each inside 
firm is induced to meet ROO.  Accordingly, profit functions of the thr  firm in country i  for the 
two alternative trade regimes are as follows:27 
(i) , , ,( )
i i
i r i i r j j rp q p h q     after forming an FTA with effective ROO;        (5a) 
(ii) , , ,( )
i i
i r i i r j j j rp q p t q     prior to the FTA formation.           (5b) 
In the above two equations, the first term is profit from domestic sales while the second term is 
export profit from serving the market in a potential member country.  Note that ROO are 
applicable to exporters within the FTA.  As such, the production of the final good ,( )
i
i rq  by each 
inside firm for sales in its domestic market is not subject to the ROO content requirements in 
equation (1). 
As for the profit function of the thk  firm in country ,C  it is given as 
, ,( ) ( ) ,
C C C
k A A A k B B B kp t q p t q                   (6) 
In what follows, we first examine the post-FTA regime with effective ROO in a three-
stage Nash game of trade under oligopoly.  In stage one both countries A  and B  identify the 
acceptable range of a welfare-improving content ratio.  In stage two the FTA countries 
independently and simultaneously determine optimal external tariffs that maximize their 
individual welfare subject to the ROO-complying condition (see equation (4)), given a content 
ratio.  In stage three each inside firm determines the amounts of the final good for domestic sales 
                                                 
26 The result of a higher input cost is in accordance with Krishina (2006, p. 21) who indicates that “RoO can also 
“provide an incentive for regional producers to buy intermediate goods from regional sources, even if their prices 
are higher than those of the identical import from outside the FTA, in order to make their product originate in the 
FTA and qualify for preferential treatment.”  
27As in Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005), Mukunoki (2004), and Ishikawa, Mizoguchi, and Mukunoki (2007), we 
assume that transportation costs are relatively small or zero and hence can be ignored for analytical simplicity.  
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and for export to a member country’s market in order to maximize its own profit, given the 
content ratio and tariffs.  Also, each outside firm decides on its final-good exports to the FTA 
markets. 
We then examine the pre-FTA regime, the equilibrium of which is used as the benchmark 
to evaluate the FTA equilibrium with effective ROO.  For the pre-FTA regime, there involves a 
two-stage Nash game of trade under oligopoly.  In stage one both countries A and B 
independently and simultaneously determine optimal tariff rates that maximize their respective 
social welfare.  In stage two, all the firms in the three-country world independently and 
simultaneously decide on their outputs that maximize individual profits, given the optimal tariffs. 
 
2.2 Nash Equilibrium Outputs of the Inside and Outside Firms 
As standard in game theory, we use backward induction to solve for the sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium of the two alternative trade regimes as follows: 
(i) Post-FTA with effective ROO 
For the post-FTA regime, we first determine the quantities of the final good produced by 
the inside and outside firms (under the conditions that the content ratio and optimal tariffs are 
given).  The problem facing an inside firm in member country ( , )i A B  is to determine the 
quantities of the final good to be sold in its domestic market and in the member 
county  ( , , )j A B i  , , ,{ , },i ii r j rq q  that maximize the firm’s profit function in (5a), subject to the 
ROO content requirements in equation (1) and the market demand in equation (4).   The first-
order conditions (FOCs) are given, respectively, as 
, , , ,
1 1 1
( ) 0;
m m n
i j C i
i r i s i k i r
r s k
q q q q  
  
                                 (7a) 
, , , ,
1 1 1
( ) 0.
m m n
i j C i
i r i s i k j r
r s k
q q q h q   
  
                                    (7b) 
The assumption of symmetry implies that the quantities of the final good produced by m  firms 
in country i for their domestic market are identical.  That is, ,
i i
i r iq q  for 1,..., .r m  Similarly, 
for the final good exported to the other member country’s market, we have ,
j j
i s iq q  for 
1,..., .s m  
The objective of the thk , ( 1,..., ),k n outside firm in country C  is to determine the 
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quantities of the final good, , ,{ , },
C C
A k B kq q  to be exported to the FTA markets that maximize the 
firm’s profit C  in equation (6) subject to the market demand in equation (4).  The FOCs are 
given, respectively, as 
, , , ,
1 1 1
( ) 0;
m m n
i j C C
i r i s i k A A k
r s k
q q q t q  
  
                            (8a) 
, , , ,
1 1 1
( ) 0.
m m n
i j C C
i r i s i k B B k
r s k
q q q t q  
  
             (8b) 
The assumption of symmetry of firms in country C  implies that ,
C C
i k iq q  for 1,..., .k n  Using 
the FOCs in equations (7) and (8), we solve for the Nash equilibrium levels of the final good 
produced by the inside and outside firms are: 
;
(1 2 )
i i
i
nt m hq
m n
 

     
(1 ) ;
(1 2 )
j i
i
nt m n hq
m n
 

       
(1 2 ) .
(1 2 )
C i
i
m t m hq
m n
 

              (9(a-c)) 
The equilibrium price and consumption of the final good in each member country are: 
;
1 2
i
i
nt m hp
m n
       
(2 ) .
(1 2 )
i
i
m n nt m hQ
m n
 

    
                      (10(a-b)) 
 
(ii) Pre-FTA 
Next, we discuss the benchmark case of the Pre-FTA regime for the three-country world.  
In this case, the final-good producers in countries A  and B  purchase their intermediate inputs 
from country C  because of a relatively lower input price there.  Under the same assumptions of 
a linear demand and constant marginal costs, we calculate the Nash equilibrium levels of the 
final good produced by the firms in the three countries as follows: 
( ) ;
(1 2 )
i i
i
m n tq
m n


     
( 1) ;
(1 2 )
j i
i
m tq
m n


     
(1 ) ;
(1 2 )
C i
i
m tq
m n


                         (11(a-c)) 
The equilibrium price and total consumption of the final good in countries A  and B  are: 
( ) ;
1 2
i
i
m n tp
m n
      
(2 ) ( ) .
(1 2 )
i
i
m n m n tQ
m n


                               (12(a-b) 
 
 
 
 
 73 
 
3. Optimal External Tariffs (Subject to Full Compliance with ROO) 
We now proceed to the second stage of the game at which potential member countries 
independently determine their optimal external tariffs on final-good imports for the two 
alternative regimes.  We assume that each of the countries adopts a Cournot strategy in choosing 
an external tariff rate that maximizes its own social welfare.  Using the equilibrium external 
tariffs, we then derive the condition under which firms producing within the FTA choose to meet 
ROO.   As in the trade literature, we define social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, and tariff revenue. 
(i) Post-FTA 
We first calculate the optimal external tariff set by the government of each FTA member.  
Under the assumption that market demand is linear (see equation (4)), post-FTA consumer 
surplus in member country ( , )i A B  is: 
2( ) ( ) ,
2 2
i i i
i
p Q pS   
                 (13) 
where the Nash equilibrium price of the final good is given in (10(a)).  A member country’s 
producer surplus is the sum of firm profits from its domestic market and from exports.  Using the 
profit function of each inside firm in equation (5a), country i ’s post-FTA producer surplus is: 
2 2[ ( ) ] [( ) ( ) ],i i i ii i i i j j i jm m p q p h q m q q                         (14) 
where iiq  and ijq  are the firm’s domestic sales and exports of the final good as given in equations 
(9a) and (9b).  In the presence of FTA formation with effective ROO, each member country 
charges a specific tariff only on the final-good imports from country .C   Country i’s tariff 
revenue then is: 
( ).Ci i iR t nq                (15) 
It follows from equations (13)-(15) that each member country’s social welfare is given as follows: 
2
2 2( ) [( ) ( ) ] .
2
i i Ci
i i j i i
pW m q q t nq 
                                      (16) 
Note that when the input cost increase ( )h  is strictly less than the specific tariff ( )it , all the 
inside firms find it beneficial to comply with ROO.  To make the ROO enforceable, each 
member country’s government sets its tariff at a level higher than the input cost increase.  The 
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objective of member country i  is to choose its optimal tariff that maximizes iW  in equation (16) 
subject to the constraint that inside firms comply with the ROO (i.e., it h  in equation (4)). 
Depending on the value of , we have two possible solutions as illustrated in Lemma 1. 
LEMMA 1. In the three-country model of trade under oligopoly, the optimal external tariffs ( )it  
for FTA members to induce full compliance with ROO depends crucially on the value of the 
content ratio.  There are two possibilities: 
(i)  (1 2 ) (2 4 )
(1 2 )(2 4 )i
m m m n ht
m m n
         when ˆ0 ,    
where (2 1)ˆ ;
( 1)(4 2)
m
m m n h
                   (17) 
(ii)  ˆ  when ,
( 1)i i
t h
m h
         
where i  is a positive infinitesimal number. 28              
(18) 
PROOF:  See Appendix A-1. ∎ 
 
It is straightforward to verify from equations (17) and (18) that  it h  and  / 0.it      
We thus have Lemma 2: 
LEMMA 2: Over the effectively enforceable range of the ROO content requirements in 
an FTA, the optimal external tariffs and the content ratio are positively related. 
The finding in Lemma 2 has an interesting policy implication.  External tariffs and 
regional input restrictions are fundamentally strategic complements, viewed from the perspective 
of effectively inducing firms producing within the FTA to comply with ROO.  
 
(ii) Pre-FTA 
Prior to the FTA formation, a potential member country’s external tariff applies to all 
imports of the final good, regardless of where they are imported.  Under the same demand 
                                                 
28 We rule out the case that  / [( 1) ]m h    because the quantities of the final good produced by the outside firms 
in country C are negative.  Also, when the content ratio is “significantly high,” there does not exist an interior 
solution for the optimal tariff. 
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condition (see equation (4)), country i’s consumer surplus is given as 2( ) 2 ,i iS p    where 
,i A B  and ip  is the pre-FTA market price of the final good (see question 12(a)).  Producer 
surplus, which is the sum of firm profits from the domestic market and the market in a member 
country, is 2 2[( ) ( ) ],i ii i jm q q    where iiq  and ijq  are given in equations 11(a) and 11(b).  As 
for the total tariff revenue collected by i, it is the sum of tariff incomes from country j  and 
country .C   That is, ( ),j Ci i i iR t mq nq   where jiq  and Ciq  are the quantities of the final-good 
imports as given in equations 11(b) and 11(c). 
It follows that the pre-FTA welfare for a potential member country i is: 
2
2 2( ) [( ) ( ) ] ( ),
2
i i C ji
i i j i i i
pW m q q t nq mq 
               (19) 
Setting the first-order derivative of iW  with respect to it  to zero, we solve for country i’s pre-
FTA optimal tariff: 
2
(2 1) .
2 5 2i
mt
m m n
                  (20) 
The strict concavity of iW  on it  implies that the interior solution for the pre-FTA tariff is unique. 
Based on the pre-FTA welfare and tariff, our next step is to analyze the welfare 
implications of an FTA over the enforceable range of the content ratio. 
 
4. The Maximum Extent of the Welfare-Enhancing ROO in an FTA 
Unless the formation of an FTA is based on noneconomic or political objectives, it is 
plausible to assume that FTA partners are willing to sign in ROO provisions that are capable of 
improving their social welfare.  Given that ROO are imperative in an FTA and may constitute as 
protective devices, the issue then is the maximum extent of regional content requirements that 
guarantees welfare gains from trade for all the participating members.  To deal with this issue, 
we evaluate the post-FTA welfare for each member, using its pre-FTA welfare as the reference 
base.  We then derive the conditions under which there are gains from trade for the FTA, as well 
as voluntary compliance with ROO input restrictions. 
Recall Lemma 1 that for 0 [( 1) ],m h     the ROO-complying condition (i.e., 
equation (4)) can be satisfied when the optimal external tariff is it  (see equation (17)).  To 
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calculate each member country’s post-FTA welfare, we first substitute it  into the output and 
price equations in (9) and (10), and then substitute the resulting equilibrium outputs and price 
into iW  in equation (16) to obtain  
2 2 2
2
2 2 2
2
2 2 2
2 2
3 2 2 2
2
(16 8 16 2 ) 8 ( 1)
2 (4 2) 2 (2 1)(4 2)
(4 5 2) ˆ if 0 ;
2 (2 1)
(4 4 4 ) 2 ( 2 )( 1)
2 (2 1) 2 (2 1)
(4 5 4 2 2 )   if 
2 (2 1)
i
i
m mn m n n m m h
m n m m n
m m m h
m
W
m mn m n n m m h
m n m n
m m mn m n n h
m n
  
 
  
  
 
 
        
   

       
      

ˆ ;
( 1)m h
 
   
  (21) 
where i  is an infinitesimal number since  
2
2 2
2 [(1 ) ( 1)(4 2) ] (2 1)(4 2)
      4 ( ) 2 .
i i i
j j
n m m m n h n m m n
mn h mh mn
    
    
         
     
Next, we calculate the pre-FTA welfare for each potential member country.  We first 
substitute t  in equation (20) back into the output and price equations in (11) and (12), and then 
substitute the resulting equilibrium outputs and price into iW  in equation (19) to obtain  
2 4 3 2 2 2
2 2
(4 20 4 29 10 12 2 ) .
2 (2 5 2)i
m m m n m mn m n nW
m m n


            (22) 
In what follows, we compare iW   with iW  in order to determine the conditions under 
which there is a welfare improvement for FTA with effective ROO. 
One question we need to answer is: Is there a welfare gain to each FTA member when the 
content ratio    is set at a value that satisfies the following condition: ˆ [( 1) ]m h     ?  The 
answer is negative because in this case each member’s post-FTA welfare is strictly lower than its 
pre-FTA level.29   We therefore rule out this case and consider the range of the content ratio: 
ˆ0 .     Interestingly, the welfare function in (21) is strictly convex on   as illustrated by the 
following second-order derivative: 
                                                 
29 See Appendix A-2 for detailed derivations. 
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2 2 2
2 2
(4 5 2) 0.
(2 1)
iW m m m h
m 
    

 
To calculate the critical value of the content ratio that a potentially participating country 
finds it indifferent between forming or not forming an FTA with ROO, we solve i iW W  and 
obtain the following solution: 
2
2 2 2 3 2
(2 1)[4( 1)(2 5 2) ] ,
(5 4 2)(18 4 2 9 24 8 4)
W
L
m m m m n
m m m n m n mn m m n h
                       (23a) 
where 
2 2 3 4 5 2 2
3 2 2 3 4 2 5 6
(2108 16 10 125 112 68 16 10
   8 74 282 368 272 4 128 32 16) 0.
m n mn m n m n m n m n m n
m n mn m m m n m m
        
                 (23b) 
It is easy to very that WL  is strictly less than ˆ, which implies that WL  is the maximum 
limit of the welfare-improving content ratio.  Moreover, we have 
0iW
 

 for ˆ.WL              (23c) 
Given the strict convexity of the welfare function, we establish the first proposition as follows: 
PROPOSITION 1: In the three-country model of international oligopoly, each member 
country’s post-FTA welfare is strictly greater than its pre-FTA welfare, i.e., ,i iW W  when the 
ROO content ratio falls into the effectively enforceable region: ˆ.WL      There are three 
possibilities: 
(i) If 1,WL   the range of the welfare-improving content ratio is (0,1];  
(ii) If 0 1,WL   the range of the welfare-improving content ratio is (0, )WL and this range 
increases as h  increases; 
(iii) But if 0,WL    there exists no content ratio that improves social welfare. 
PROOF:  See Appendix A-3. ∎ 
The maximum limit of the welfare-improving contain ratio in an FTA under international 
oligopoly has not been identified in the existing literature.  Furthermore, WL  in equation (23a) 
indicates an interesting relationship between the structure of the oligopolistic final-good market 
in each member country (in terms of m  and )n  and the formation of a welfare-improving FTA 
with ROO.  Figure 1 illustrates a graphical interpretation of the relationship.  The L-shape curve 
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satisfies the condition that 24( 1) (2 5 2) .m m m n       For ( , )m n  such that 
24( 1) (2 5 2) ,m m m n       we have 0WL   in Area I which is lying below the curve.  
Area I thus shows the structure of the final-good market that is consistent with both the ROO-
complying condition and the welfare-improving condition for the FTA members.  This analysis 
allows us to establish 
PROPOSITION 2. If the structure of the final-good market, captured by ( , ),m n  is such 
that 
24( 1)(2 5 2) ,m m m n                  (24) 
where  is given in equation (23b), the welfare-improving condition is violated because 0.WL    
In this case, FTA formation with ROO is welfare deteriorating.  But if the market structure is 
such that 
24( 1)(2 5 2) ,m m m n                  (25) 
the welfare-improving condition is satisfied because 0.WL    In this case, FTA formation with 
ROO is welfare improving.  Nevertheless, due to the strict convexity of the welfare function on 
(0, min(1, )),WL   each member country’s post-FTA welfare increases as the content ratio 
decreases.  That is, 0iW     for ˆ.WL      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Figure 1.  Market structure of the final good and the welfare-improving content ratio 
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The findings in Proposition 1 imply that an FTA with ROO is always welfare enhancing 
for the special case where 1,m n   an assumption frequently adopted in models of strategic 
trade policies under imperfect competition.  Our analysis further implies that different market 
structures of final goods play a role in affecting whether there is a welfare improvement from 
trade for FTA with ROO. 
 
5. Economic Implications of the Model 
5.1 Economic Effects of FTA Formation 
Having identified the maximum limit of content requirements that not only induces final-
good producers to meet ROO but also generates welfare gains for all participating countries, we 
proceed to analyze economic implications of forming an FTA. 
First, FTA formation with ROO apparently affects the optimal decisions of member 
countries on their external tariffs to non-member countries.  A comparison between it  in (17) and   
it  in (20) reveals that
30 
i it t  for ˆ0 .WL                  (26) 
This indicates that, for any welfare-improving content ratio that induces ROO compliance, the 
post-FTA external tariffs are lower than the pre-FTA external tariffs.  Interestingly, the extent to 
which the external tariffs are reduced, defined as ,i i it t t     depends crucially on the value of 
the content ratio, the increase in production costs of using the FTA-made input under ROO, and 
the size of the final-good market in each member country.  Form equations (17) and (20), it 
follows that 
( ) 0,it
    
( ) 0,it
h
    and 
( ) 0.it
              (27) 
The results in equations (26) and (27) lead to the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3.  In the three-country model of trade under imperfect competition,  
                                                 
30 See Appendix A-4 for detailed derivations. 
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(i) After the formation of an FTA with ROO, each member country lowers its external tariff on 
the final-good imports, as compared its pre-FTA tariff.  For a full compliance with ROO, the 
post-FTA external tariff remains to be higher than the increase in the unit cost of using the FTA-
made input.   
(ii) Other thing being equal, the resulting reduction in the external tariff is greater as the content 
ratio decreases over its welfare-improving range.  Moreover, the lower the ROO-induced input 
cost increase or the larger the market size of the final good in each member country, the greater 
the reduction in the external tariff. 
The findings in Proposition 3 have policy implications.  The post-FTA tariffs are 
systematically lower than the pre-FTA tariffs in response to the FTA formation.  Additionally, 
there is voluntary compliance with FTA content regulations because the ROO-induced input cost 
increase is strictly lower than the post-FTA tariff.  Our analysis thus rules out the possibilities of 
regime switches in an FTA with ROO as discussed by Ju and Krishna (2002, 2005).   
Next, we examine what effects FTA formation have on the production decisions of all the 
inside and outside firms, total consumption and market price of the final good, consumer surplus, 
producer surplus, as well as the aggregate volumes of trade in both the final good and the 
intermediate input.  By substituting the optimal external tariff  it  (under the condition that 
0 WL    ) from (17) into equations (9), (10), (13) and (14), we obtain the sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium quantities of the final good produced by the inside and outside firms as follows:   
  2 ;
(2 4 ) (1 2 )
i
i
m hq
m n m
 
    
2 ( 1) ;
(2 4 ) (1 2 )
j
i
m hq
m n m
 
 
     .(2 4 )
c
iq m n

        (28a) 
The equilibrium price and consumption of the final good in each member country are: 
2
2 4 1 2i
m hp
m n m
      and 
(4 ) ;
(4 2) (2 1)i
m n m hQ
m n m
 
 
   
        (28b) 
and the consumer and producer surplus are: 
 2
2 2
(2 1)(4 ) (2 4 )
;
2 (2 1) (4 2)i
m m n m n m h
S
m m n
 

       
          (28c) 
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2 2 2 2
2 2
8 4 (2 2 1) .
(4 2) (2 1)(4 2) (2 1)i
m h m m h
m n m m n m
  

            
       (28d) 
Despite the binding ROO in an FTA, the final good ( iiq ) produced by an inside firm for 
its own domestic market is not subject to the regional content requirements.  As the imported 
intermediate input is relatively cheaper, this part of the final-good production for own domestic 
consumption uses entirely the imported input from country C.  In producing the final good ( ijq ) 
for export to another member country within the FTA, an inside firm that complies with ROO 
uses ijq   amount of the more expensive FTA-made input and (1 ) ijq   amount of the imported 
input.  As a result, the total amount of the intermediate input imported by all the inside firms is 
given as  
      28 4 2 22 (1 ) .
(4 2) (4 2) (2 1)
i i
i j
m h mhX m q q m
m n m n m
      
                
          (29) 
For calculating the equilibrium solution to the pre-FTA regime, which serves as the 
benchmark case, we substitute the optimal tariff  it  from (20) into equations (11) and (12) to 
derive the following: 
2
2 ( 1) ;
(2 5 2)
i
i
mq
m m n


      2 ;(2 5 2)
j
iq m m n

     2 ;(2 5 2)
C
iq m m n

     
   2
2 ( 1) ;
2 5 2i
mp
m m n
      
2
2
(2 3 ) ;
(2 5 2)i
m m nQ
m m n


       
Consumer and producer surplus of country ( , )i i A B  are 
   
2 2 2
2 2
(2 3 ) ;
2 (2 5 2)i
m m nS
m m n


      
2 2
2 2
(4 8 5) .
(2 5 2)i
m m m
m m n


               (30) 
In the pre-FTA equilibrium, the final-good firms in countries A and B import their inputs 
completely from country C due to a relatively lower price there.  That is,   
2
2 (2 3)2 ( ) .
(2 5 2)
i j
i i
m mX m q q
m m n


                 (31) 
It comes as no surprise that each inside firm sells less of the final good to its own 
domestic market after the FTA is formed.  That is,  
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i i
i iq q .    
As shown in Appendix A-5, we have 
 
PROPOSITION 4. After the formation of an FTA with effective ROO, the equilibrium quantity 
of the final good sold by an inside firm to its domestic market decreases and the final good’s 
equilibrium price decreases.  Each inside firm’s profit from serving its own domestic market 
decreases.  Because the final good’s market price decreases, total consumption of the good in 
each member country increases.  Consequently, consumers within the FTA are better off.  
Furthermore, we show in Appendix A-6 that  
   ,j ji iq q  ,C Ci iq q  and .C C             (32)  
Thus, each firm in a member country increases its final-good exports to another country within 
the FTA.  Also, each firm producing outside the FTA increases its final-good exports to the FTA 
markets and hence its export profit increases.  These results lead to the following proposition:  
PROPOSITION 5. After the formation of an FTA with effective ROO, two-way trade in the final 
good between the FTA members increases.  Exports into the FTA of the final good from a non-
member country also increase.  As a consequence, the total volume of the final-good trade for all 
the exporting firms inside and outside the FTA unambiguously increases.  Moreover, there is an 
increase in the profits of the outside firms that export the final good to the FTA markets. 
Although a successful FTA may has a positive trade-creating effect within its region, a 
considerable concern is that there may involve a negative trade-diverting effect from the more 
efficient outside firms to the less efficient inside firms.  In our model, the negative effect of trade 
diversion occurs not in the final-good sector.  Outside firms are able to increase their final-good 
exports to the FTA markets due to tariff reductions induced by the FTA formation.  The question 
then is the potential negative effect on trade in the intermediate input.  To answer this question, 
we compare X  in equation (29) to X  in equation (31) for 0 .WL     As shown in Appendix 
A-7, we find that  
X X  if  (4 2 2) 0.m n mn                (33) 
If (4 2 2) 0,m n mn     however, the effect of FTA formation with ROO on the intermediate-
input trade is indeterminate.  This effect is shown to depend on the size and structure of the final-
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good market, as well as the increase in production cost of using a more expensive regional input.  
We thus have  
PROPOSITION 6. (i) FTA formation with effective ROO lowers the total volume of the intermediate- 
input trade when the structure of the oligopolistic final-good market is such that (4 2 2) 0.m n mn     
(ii) But when (4 2 2) 0,m n mn     the formation of an FTA with effective ROO has an 
ambiguous effect on trade in the intermediate input. 
As we have analyzed above, after establishing an FTA with effective ROO, each firm’s 
profit is lower in its own domestic market but is higher from serving the market in a member 
country.  The issue then is how the FTA affects the profitability of the inside firms.  For any 
content ratio that satisfies ˆ0 ,    we show in Appendix A-8 that .i i    We therefore have 
PROPOSITION 7. FTA formation with effective ROO makes the firms producing within the FTA 
worse off.  Nevertheless, each member country’s producer surplus increases as the content ratio 
decreases, ceteris paribus. 
 The finding in Proposition 7 stands in contrast with the result shown by Ju and Krishna 
(2005) that firms producing within an FTA gains from the FTA with ROO.  The difference lies in 
the assumptions.  In the three-country model of Ju and Krishna (2005), the potential member 
countries do not engage in trade prior to the establishment of an FTA.  The FTA allows market 
access since firms producing within the region are able to sell their final goods to the markets in 
member countries.  The other difference is that Ju and Krishna analyze the small-country case in 
which all markets are perfectly competitive.  In the three-country model we consider, the 
potential member countries engage in two-way trade with import tariffs priori to establishing an 
FTA.  There is a duty-free access when firms producing within the FTA meet ROO.  Also, we 
assume that the final-good markets are characterized by international oligopoly.   
The finding of Proposition 7 is consistent with an interesting result in Ishikawa, 
Mizoguchi, and Mukunoki (2007), although the underlying reasons differ.  In their price-
competition model of differentiated goods produced by an inside firm and an outside firm, the 
authors show the possibility that the inside firm complies with ROO but loses from the ROO.  
This outcome arises because, when complying with ROO, the inside firm loses its market power 
in practicing price discrimination across the final-good markets. In our three-country model of 
international oligopoly with a homogeneous final good, inside firms lose because external tariff 
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reductions cause by the FTA formation significantly lower the good’s market price. 
5.2 The Comparative Statics of the Content Ratio 
Finally, we examine economic effects of changes in the content ratio.  We have from 
equations (28a)-(28d) the following derivatives (see Appendix A-9):     
0,
i
iq

 

 0,
j
iq

 

 0,
C
iq

 

 0,iQ
 

 0,ip
 

 0,iS
 

 0,i
 

 and 0,X
 

   
where the content ratio satisfies the welfare-improving condition, 0 .WL     It follows that a 
decrease in the content ratio lowers the domestic sales of the final good by each inside firm, but 
increases its final-good exports to the market in a member country.  Interestingly, exports of the 
final good from country C to the FTA are independent of the content ratio.  This can be explained 
by the strategic complementarily between the optimal external tariff and the welfare-improving 
content ratio.  A reduction in external tariffs induced by FTA formation has a positive effect on 
the exports of the final good by the firms producing outside the FTA.  This positive effect is 
offset by the implementation of ROO content requirements, which has a negative effect on the 
final-good exports of the outside firms.    
Under the FTA with effective ROO, each inside firm incurs a higher input cost of serving 
the final-good market in a member country in order to be qualified for duty-free treatment.  Each 
inside firm’s per-unit profit from exports and how this profit is affected by a change in the 
content ratio are calculated as follows: 
2 ( 1)
2 4 1 2i
m hp h
m n m
        and  
( ) 0.ip h
  

 
With a less stringent content ratio, each inside firm’s per-unit profit from exporting the final good 
to a member’s market increases.  Given that the profitability of the final-good exports is 
negatively related to the content ratio, the firms producing within the FTA increase their final-
good exports as the content ratio decreases.  This explains why 0.jiq      We also find that 
the increase in the final-good exports by all the inside firms within the FTA exceeds the decrease 
in their domestic sales.  Since the final-good imports from outside of the FTA are not affected by 
a change in the content ratio, the final good’s market price unambiguously decreases.  This 
explains why 0.ip     As a consequence, consumers in the FTA benefit from a less stringent 
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ROO.   
Because an inside firm’s per-unit profit from its domestic market decreases when the 
content ratio decreases, the firm sells less of the final good to its own market, 0.iiq      
Although a decrease in the content ratio negatively affects each member’s domestic sales, this 
negative effect is dominated by the increase in the two-way trade of the final good within the 
FTA.  As the final good’s equilibrium price decreases, each inside firm’s profit unambiguously 
decreases.  This explains why 0.i     
It comes as not a surprise that when ROO become less restrictive, the total volume of the 
final-good trade within the FTA increases.  In this case, imports into the FTA of the intermediate 
unambiguously increases. This explains why 0.X     
 
 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks    
It has been widely recognized in the literature that preferential ROO constitute an 
indispensible part of FTAs for preventing trade deflection and have the potential to be 
strategically used as protectionist barriers to trade.  Nevertheless, relatively little or no research 
has been conducted to identify explicitly the socially acceptable/enforceable range of ROO 
content requirements over which there are welfare gains from trade for FTA formation under 
imperfect competition. 31   This paper presents a three-country, partial equilibrium model of trade 
under oligopoly to analyze the welfare implications of forming an FTA with effectively 
enforceable ROO.  Specifically, we derive the conditions under which the inside firms obey 
ROO content requirements and receive duty-free treatment for their exports to member countries 
                                                 
31 In the theoretical literature on free trade areas/arrangements and strategic trade policies, the welfare effects of 
ROO content provisions has frequently been ignored due to the complexity of the issues involved.  There are some 
exceptions, including the contributions mentioned in the introduction section of this paper.  Another notable 
exception is the book edited by Cadot et. al. (2006), which contains a collection of recent studies on issues related to 
ROO.  Cadot et al. (2006) indicate that ROO act as trade barriers and become new policy instruments.  The authors 
further contend that the design and implementation of ROO should occupy the central stage in negotiation and 
functioning of preferential trade agreements.   
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within an FTA.  Although FTA formation benefits consumers at the expense of firms producing 
within the FTA, each member country’s social welfare may increase, depending on a set of 
economic variables.  These variables include the value of the content ratio, the reduction in 
external tariffs stemming from the FTA formation, the differences in costs between using a 
regional input and a cheaper input from outside the FTA, each member country’s market size of a 
final good, as well as the structure of the oligopolistic final-good market.  These economic 
variables also affect the maximum limit of the welfare-improving ROO content requirements.  
We show that potential member countries find it optimal to reduce external tariffs when forming 
an FTA.  External tariffs and ROO are thus strategic substitutes in terms of FTA formation.  But 
the optimal external tariffs increase with the ROO content ratio in order to induce firms 
producing within the FTA to meet ROO.  The two policy instruments to a certain degree become 
strategic complements in terms of ROO compliance. The findings in our analysis contribute to 
the recent literature on regional trade agreements, in that it provides new insights on the 
endogenous determination of external tariffs that generate full compliance with ROO, on the 
maximum extent of the restrictive ROO content requirements, as well as on the resulting welfare 
consequences of FTA with effectively enforceable ROO under imperfect competition.   
We further discuss issues on trade creation and trade diversion by analyzing whether FTA 
formation increases total trade or whether the extra trade arises at the expense of non-members.  
Within the enforceable range of a welfare-enhancing content ratio, the aggregate volume of the 
final-good exports by all the firms inside and outside the FTA increases.  The FTA with effective 
ROO has a positive effect on the final-good trade.   The trade-diverting effect thus does not occur 
in the final-good sector.  Surprisingly, ROO may not have a diverting effect on imports into the 
FTA of the intermediate input by outside firms, depending upon the value of the content ratio, the 
increase in the cost of using a more expensive regional input, and the structure of the final-good 
market. 
Some caveats and the potentially interesting extensions of the simple model should be 
mentioned.  Although ROO are considered as an integral part of preferential trade agreements for 
member countries, their implementation involves administrative and bureaucratic costs, which 
are completely ignored in our model.  One would expect that these costs affect the degree to 
which the optimal external tariffs are reduced, as well as the likelihood of establishing a 
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successful FTA with effective ROO. 32   A possible extension is to incorporate production 
differentiation into the oligopolistic model to analyze how the intensity of competition in the 
final-good markets affects the welfare implications of FTA formation.  The positive analysis of 
ROO in an FTA in the present paper also abstracts from the consideration of possible 
interactions between interest groups and government.  Trade liberalization without preferential 
treatments may not always be politically feasible, once one looks at how active interest groups 
may have in lobbying government for protections.  As stressed by Krugman (1993), preferential 
trading arrangements may have to be accepted as the second-best option to liberalize trade before 
moving toward the first-best economic solutions. 
                                                 
32 Noting the fact that the NATFA agreement contains up to 200 pages on ROO provisions as an example, Krishna 
(2006) indicates that ROO might be strategically used.  She further points out that documenting ROO is quite 
expensive for exporting firms so that they may simply pay tariffs instead of going through the more costly 
documentation. 
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Appendix 
 
This appendix presents detailed derivations of key findings in the paper. 
 
A-1. Proof of Lemma 1. 
 
The constrained welfare maximization problem is rewritten as follows: 
2 2 2(1 )1max ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 1 (1 2 ) (1 2 )
(1 2 )             
(1 2 )
ji i
i
i
i
nt n m hnt mh nt mhW m
m n m n m n
m t mhnt
m n
       
 

                 
    

 
subject to the constraints that the inside and outside firms produce non-negative levels of the final good.  
According to equations (4), 9(b) , and 9(c), these constrained conditions are:  
(1 ) 0,int n m h       (1 2 ) 0,im t m h      and 0.it k      
The Lagrangian function is: 
           
2 2 2
1 2
(1 )1 ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 1 (1 2 ) (1 2 )
(1 2 )     [ (1 ) ] [ (1 2 ) ].
(1 2 )
ji i
i
i i
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m n m n m n
m t mhnt nt n m h m t m h
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       
                 
            
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
          1 22
[(1 2 ) (2 1)(4 2) (2 4 ) ] (1 2 ) 0
(2 1)
in m m m n t m n m h£ n m
t m n
   
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          1 1[ (1 ) ] 0, 0, (1 ) 0i int n m h nt n m h                  
          2 2[ (1 2 ) ] 0 , 0, (1 2 ) 0i im t m h m t m h                
           0.it h            
It follows that the first- and second-order derivatives of iW  with respect to it  are given, respectively, as  
2
[(1 2 ) (2 1)(4 2) (2 4 ) ] ;
(2 1)
i i
i
W n m m m n t m n m h
t m n
 

          
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2
2 2
(2 1)(4 2) 0.
(2 1)
i
i
W n m m n
t m n
       

 
Because the objective function iW  is strictly concave on it  and the constrained conditions are linear, we 
set the derivative i
i
W
t



 to zero and calculate the solution to the constrained optimization problem as 
 
(1 2 ) (2 4 ) (2 1) if 0 .
(1 2 )(2 4 ) ( 1)(4 2)i
m m m n h mt
m m n m m n h
               
 
From equation (9(c)), we find that if 
( 1)m h
   each firm in country C chooses not to export the final 
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good to the FTA markets.  In this case, , 0
C
i kq  .  Substituting , 0Ci kq   into each inside firm’s profit 
function (see equation (5a)) and maximizing the resulting profit function subject to the restriction that  
( 1)m h
    yields the firm’s optimal outputs as follows: 
i
iq m

  and 0.
j
iq                    
Since , 0
C
i kq   and 0,jiq  there will be no trade in the final good.  We therefore rule out the case that 
( 1)m h
   . 
If the content ratio falls into the range 
(2 1) ,
( 1)(4 2) ( 1)
m
m m n h m h
        there will be no 
interior and unique solution for the welfare maximization problem.  Due to the fact that  
(1 2 ) (2 4 )
(1 2 )(2 4 )
0
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i
m m m n ht
i m m n
W
t        
  

 and the strict concavity of iW  on ,it  we have   
0.
i
i
t h
i
W
t 
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
   
We cannot rule out the possibility that both of the following inequalities are satisfied:  
(2 1)
( 1)(4 2) ( 1)
m
m m n h m h
        and .it h    
Given the objective of obtaining an improvement in social welfare, each member country sets its external 
tariff at a level that is slightly greater than the ROO-induced input cost increase.  That is, to induce ROO 
compliance, member country i sets its tariff rate to be ,i it h    where i  is an infinitesimal positive 
number. 
 
A-2. Proof that  i iW W  if ˆ .( 1)m h
     
Recall from Lemma 1 that 
(2 1)if .
( 1)(4 2) ( 1)i i
mt h
m m n h m h
           Substituting 
i it h    into iW  gives each member country’s post-FTA welfare when with the content ratio satisfies 
the above inequality condition. We find that 
,
i i ii i it h t h
W W           
where i  is an infinitesimal number and 
2
2 2
2 [(1 ) ( 1)(4 2) ] (2 1)(4 2)
      4 ( ) 2 .
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    
         
      
Since i  is a very small number and can be ignored, we compare iW  and iW  for the case when  
  
(2 1) .
( 1)(4 2) ( 1)
m
m m n h m h
          
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Replacing h  with it  gives    .
i i i
j
i t h i t h i i t hW W t nq        
Because the values of it  and 
j
iq  are all positive, we have    .
i i i i
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Given that iW  is maximized when 2
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This further implies that  
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A-3. Proof of Proposition 1. 
 
To calculate the critical level of the content ratio at which ,i iW W  we apply the Weda’s Theorem to this 
equality condition, using their expressions in equations (21) and (22), to get two possible roots:  
2
2 2 2 3 2
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where  W WL H   and  
2 2 3 4 5 2 2
3 2 2 3 4 2 5 6
(2108 16 10 125 112 68 16 10
   8 74 282 368 272 4 128 32 16) 0.
m n mn m n m n m n m n m n
m n mn m m m n m m
        
             
Given the strict convexity of the welfare function, it is easy to verify that i iW W  for WL   or 
.WH    The value of ˆ  lies somewhere between WL  and ,WH  i.e., ˆ .W WL H      We rule out WH  
because its value violates the ROO-complying condition.  We thus have 
0iW
 

 for 0 .WL      
If 0,WL   the welfare-improving content ratio falls into the range (0, ).WL   But if 0,WL   there does 
not exist any content ratio capable of improving social welfare. 
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A-4:  Proof of Proposition 2. 
 
(i) Recall that, if 0 ,WL   the post-FTA optimal tariff set by member country i   is  
   
(1 2 ) (4 2) .
(2 1)(4 2)i
m m n m ht
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Taking the derivative of it with respect to  yields   
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A comparison between ˆit    and it  reveals that 
   ˆ 2
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This implies that ˆ .i it t     The positive sign for the derivative 0i
t

 

 indicates the optimal tariff 
decreases as the content ratio decreases.  Given that ˆWL  , we conclude that 
  ˆ( )i it t      for 0 .WL    
Since ˆi it t    and ˆ( )i it t      , we have  
i it t  for 0 .WL     
 
(ii) Note that the reduction in external tariffs is defined as  
   2
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Taking the first-order derivatives of it  with respective to , ,h  and  , respectively, we have  
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A-5: Proof of Proposition 4. 
 
Recall that the sales of the final good by each inside firm to its domestic market before and after the FTA 
are 
2
(4 2) (2 1)
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mhq
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Taking the derivative of iiq with respect to    yields 
0.
(1 )
i
iq mh
m 
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This indicates that the post-FTA level of the final good sold to the domestic market increases as the 
 92 
 
content ratio increases.  Evaluating iiq  at where ˆ  , we have 
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It follows that  
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We thus have i ii iq q  for ˆ0 .WL       Recall that the pre- and post-FTA equilibrium prices of the 
final good in each member country are 
2
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where 0.i ii i
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
  Since ,
i i
i iq q  we have i ip p  for 0 .WL     Given that total 
consumption in each member country is negatively related to price, we have i iQ Q  for 0 .WL     
Since the post-FTA price of the final good is relatively lower and the post-FTA consumption of the good 
is relatively higher, each member country’s consumer surplus increases.  Note that each inside firm’s 
domestic profit is the product of the final-good price and its domestic sales and that the price of the 
imported input from country C is normalized to 0.  Since we have proved that i ii iq q  and i ip p , it is 
straightforward to show that i ii i  . 
 
A-6: Proof  that (i) j ji iq q , (ii) ,C Ci iq q  and (iii) C C   when 0 .WL    
 
(i) Recall that the pre- and post-FTA quantities of the final good exported to another member country’s 
market are given, respectively, as  
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Taking the derivative of jiq with respect to    yields 
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This indicates that jiq  increases as  decreases.  Also, we have 0( ) .j ji iq q      A comparison between 
0
j
iq   and jiq  reveals that  
2
0 2
(4 6 2) 0.
(4 2)(2 5 2)
j j
i i
m m nq q
m n m m n


          
We thus have 0 .
j j
i iq q    For 0 ,WL    we have ( ) .j ji iq q   
 
(ii) Recall that the post- and pre-FTA exports of the final good by an outside firm in country C to the FTA 
markets are given, respectively, as  
(2 4 )
C
iq m n

     and 2 .(2 5 2)
C
iq m m n

      
It is apparent that 22 4 2 5 2,m n m m n       which implies that C Ci iq q .  
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(iii) Using the post-FTA quantities of the final-good exports by each firm in country C and this outside 
firm’s profit function in equation (6), we calculate its post-FTA profit as follows: 
2
22 2 ( ) .
(2 4 )
C
C iqm n
  
     
     
Similarly, using the pre-FTA optimal quantities of the final-good exports by each firm in country C 
equation (6), we calculate the firm’s pre-FTA profit:  
2
2
22 2 ( ) .(2 5 2)
C
C iqm m n
  
        
Given the result in part (ii) that C Ci iq q , we have .C C   
 
A-7: Proof of Proposition 6. 
 
(i) Recall that the post- and pre-FTA quantities of the intermediate input exported from country C to the 
FTA countries are given, respectively, as  
28 4 2 2 ,
(4 2) (4 2) (2 1)
m m m h mhX
m n m n m
      
          
   
and 
2
2 (2 3) .
(2 5 2)
m mX
m m n


        
Taking the first- and second-order derivatives of  X  with respect to   yields  
4 2 4
(4 2) (2 1)
X m m h mh
m n m
    
          

 and 
2
2
4 0,X mh  
  

 
Which imply that X is strictly convex on  . Substituting (1 2 )ˆ
( 1)(4 2)
m
h m m n
        into the first-
order derive 
X




 yields ˆ
2 0.
(1 2 )
X mh
m  
    

  Thus, 0X
 

 for 0 WL   since ˆ.WL   
Note that for  0 WL   , X  increases as   decreases and 0 .X X     That is,  
   0 2
2 (4 2 2) .
(4 2)(2 5 2)
m m n mnX X
m n m m n


        
   
When (4 2 2) 0,m n mn     we have X X  for 0 .WL    
 
(ii) We discuss the case when (4 2 2) 0.m n mn      In this case 0 .X X   
Subtracting  X from  X yields 
2 ''2 1[ ] ,
(4 2) 2(2 1)
mhX X
h m n m
         
where  
  
2
''
3 2 2 2
2 (4 2 2) 2 1 .
(8 2 24 9 18 4 4) (4 2) 2(2 1)
m m n mn mh
m m n m mn m n n h m n m
 
 
                   
It is straightforward to verify that there is no solution of X X . Given 0 ,X X   we have X X  
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for 0 WL   .   If  0,   there are two possible roots for X X : 
    
''1
(4 2) 2(2 1) 2
X
L h m n m mh
       and 
''1 ,
(4 2) 2(2 1) 2
X
H h m n m mh
        
where ,X XL H   0X
L
X
  
 

 and 0.X
H
X
  
 

  Because the function X is strictly convex on   and 
0,SW
L
X
  
 

we conclude that .X WH L    Note that the sign of  ( )X WL L   is ambiguous.  For 
0 WL   , we have two possibilities: (i) X X  when ;XL  (ii) X X  when XL  . 
 
A-8: Proof  that .i i    
 
Recall that each inside firm’s total profit with and without the FTA are given, respectively, as  
2 2 2 2
2 2
8 4 (2 2 1)
(4 2) (2 1)(4 2) (2 1)i
m h m m h
m n m m n m
   
           
   
and   
2 2
2 2
(4 8 5) .
(2 5 2)i
m m m
m m n
 
      
Taking the first- and second-order derivatives of  i  with respect to   gives 
2 2
2
4 2(2 2 1)
(2 1)(4 2) (2 1)
i m h m m h
m m n m
  
 
           

 and  
2 2 2
2 2
2(2 2 1) 0.
(2 1)
i m m m h
m

 
       

 
Since 
2
2 0,
i

 

 i  is a strictly convex on .   Next, we calculate the critical value of the content ratio so 
that .i i     There are two possible roots:  
2
2 2 2 3 2
(2 1)(10 2 4 4 )
(2 2 1)(18 4 2 9 24 8 4)
PS
L
m m n m
m m m n m n mn m m n h
                  
and 
2
2 2 2 3 2
(2 1)(10 2 4 4 ) ,
(2 2 1)(18 4 2 9 24 8 4)
PS
H
m m n m
m m m n m n mn m m n h
                 
 where PS PSL H   and  
2 2 3 4 5 2 2 3 2
4 2 2 3 4 2 5 6
(8 4 2 24 112 160 64 14 24
8 8 28 64 32 128 64 4) 0.
m n mn m n m n m n m n m n m n
m n mn m m m n m m
         
            
It is straightforward to verify that ˆ0 .PS PSL H      Because i  is strictly convex on ,  we conclude 
that for ˆ0 ( )SWL     , we have .i i   
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A-9: Proof static analysis results under FTA. 
 
(i) For 0 ,WL    the equilibrium quantities, price, total consumption, and consumer surplus are given 
in equations (28a)-(28d).  Taking the derivatives of these functions with respect of  , we have 
0;
(2 1)
i
iq hm
m 
   

  
( 1) 0;
(2 1)
j
iq m h
m 
    

0;
C
iq

 

  0;
2 1
ip hm
m
   

 
0;
(2 1)
iQ mh
m 
    

 
 2
(2 1)(4 ) (2 4 ) 0;
(2 1) (4 2) (2 1)
i
i
S m m n m n m h hmmh p
m m n m
 
  
                
    
Also, taking the derivative of  iX  yields 
4 2 4
(4 2) (2 1)
iX m m h mh
m n m
    
          

, 
which indicates that i
X




 increases with .  Evaluating iX



 at where 
(1 2 )ˆ
( 1)(4 2)
m
h m m n
       , 
we have  
ˆ
2 0,
(1 2 )
iX mh
m  
    

 
which implies that 0iX
 

 for 0 WL    and ˆ.WL     
Also, taking the derivative of the post-FTA producer surplus i with respect to   yields  
2 2 2
2 2
4 (2 2 1) 2(2 1) ,
(2 1) (2 2 1)(4 2)
i m m m h m
m h m m m n
 
            

  
which implies that i increases with .  Evaluating i



 at where ,WL  we have 0.SW
L
i
  
 

 
This further implies that  
0i
 

 for 0 .WL     
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